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Political (In)Stability of Social Security Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Krzysztof Makarski

    (National Bank of Poland; Warsaw School of Economics)

  • Joanna Tyrowicz

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw; National Bank of Poland)

Abstract

In this paper we consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme (i.e. unprivatizing the pension system). We compare politically stable and politically unstable reforms and show that even if the funded system is overall welfare enhancing, the cohort distribution of benefits along the transition path turns unprivatizing social security politically favorable.

Suggested Citation

  • Krzysztof Makarski & Joanna Tyrowicz, 2015. "Political (In)Stability of Social Security Reform," Working Papers 2015-21, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
  • Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2015-21
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    pension system reform; time inconsistency; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
    • E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E27 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications

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