Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform
It is generally accepted that moving from an unfunded to a funded social security system implies a welfare loss for the transition generation—that is, the generation that has to pay twice: first, saving for its own retirement and, second, contributing to the pensions of the then retired generation. This article shows that in a setting of endogenous growth with positive externality such a transition can be Pareto improving. But it argues also that social security reform is more a pretext than a requirement for internalizing such a positive externality. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1998) 23, 119–125. doi:10.1023/A:1008622110502
Volume (Year): 23 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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