Will Social Security Survive the Baby Boom?
In this paper we consider the design and implementation of a pay-as-you-go social insurance system as a problem in political economy. We consider whether a society of forward looking rational economic agents would implement a system in which the level of benefits can depend on the relative shares of different age groups in the population. We calibrate a model economy to match long-run features of the US economy and then look at the nature of the social security system that results.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR MANUFACTURING AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, WILLIAM E. SIMON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,|
Web page: http://www.simon.rochester.edu/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-677, September.
- BOLDRIN, Michele & RUSTICHINI, Aldo, 1994.
"Equilibria with Social Security,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1994060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- H. Verbon, 1987. "The rise and evolution of public pension systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 75-100, January.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
- Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-388, September.
- Guido Tabellini, 1989.
"The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution,"
NBER Working Papers
3058, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1989. "Social Security as Trade among Living Generations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1182-1195, December.
- Jungenfelt, K., 1991. "An Analysis of Pay as you go Pension Systems as Dynastic Clubs," Papers 497, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Kramer, Gerald H, 1973. "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 285-297, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:robuge:96-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.