Will Social Security Survive the Baby Boom?
In this paper we consider the design and implementation of a pay-as-you-go social insurance system as a problem in political economy. We consider whether a society of forward looking rational economic agents would implement a system in which the level of benefits can depend on the relative shares of different age groups in the population. We calibrate a model economy to match long-run features of the US economy and then look at the nature of the social security system that results.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR MANUFACTURING AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, WILLIAM E. SIMON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,|
Web page: http://www.simon.rochester.edu/
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Kramer, Gerald H, 1973. "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 285-297, March.
- Jungenfelt, K., 1991. "An Analysis of Pay as you go Pension Systems as Dynastic Clubs," Papers 497, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1989. "Social Security as Trade among Living Generations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1182-1195, December.
- Tabellini, Guido, 1991.
"The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(2), pages 335-357, April.
- Guido Tabellini, 1989. "The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 3058, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-388, September.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
- BOLDRIN, Michele & RUSTICHINI, Aldo, 1994. "Equilibria with Social Security," CORE Discussion Papers 1994060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Rustichini, Aldo & Boldrin, Michele, 1995. "Equilibria with social security," UC3M Working papers. Economics 3903, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- H. Verbon, 1987. "The rise and evolution of public pension systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 75-100, January.
- Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-677, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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