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Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry

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Cited by:

  1. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2017. "Pricing an Experience Composite Good as Coordinated Signals," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(2), pages 163-182, March.
  2. Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, August.
  3. Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2019. "The Informational Role of Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(2), pages 606-629, April.
  4. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2012. "Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 352-360.
  5. Helmut Bester & Juri Demuth, 2015. "Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 135-154, June.
  6. P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Cheating," Working Papers 683, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  7. Bontems, Philippe & Mahenc, Philippe, 2014. "Signaling quality in vertical relationships," TSE Working Papers 14-467, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  8. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  9. Yue, Chengyan & Marette, Stephan & Beghin, John C., 2006. "How to Promote Quality Perception in Wine Markets: Brand Advertising or Geographic Indication?," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21310, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  10. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2006. "Advertising Content," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 93-113, March.
  11. Meng, Charlotte C., 2023. "The price paid: Heuristic thinking and biased reference points in the housing market," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
  12. Schmidbauer, Eric & Lubensky, Dmitry, 2018. "New and improved?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 26-48.
  13. Reme Bjørn-Atle, 2019. "Competition in Markets with Quality Uncertainty and Network Effects," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 205-242, December.
  14. Claude Fluet, 2009. "Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 134-156, May.
  15. Vaccari, Federico, 2021. "Competition in Signaling," MPRA Paper 106071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Secrecy and Safety," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1074-1091, September.
  17. Celik, Levent, 2016. "Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 113-122.
  18. Alberto Cavaliere & Giovanni Crea, 2016. "Vertical Differentiation With Consumers Misperceptions And Information Disparities," DEM Working Papers Series 122, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management.
  19. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2008. "Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal," Diskussionsschriften dp0805, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  20. Levent Çelik, 2008. "Strategic Informative Advertising in a Horizontally Differentiated Duopoly," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp359, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  21. Philippe Askenazy & Thomas Breda & Delphine Irac, 2016. "Advertising and R&D: theory and evidence from France," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 33-56, January.
  22. Ding, Yucheng, 2014. "Why Branded Firm may Benefit from Counterfeit Competition," MPRA Paper 52933, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Utaka, Atsuo, 2008. "Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 878-888, July.
  24. Hsien-Hung Chiu & Chiang-Ming Chen, 2014. "Advertising, Price and Hotel Service Quality: A Signalling Perspective," Tourism Economics, , vol. 20(5), pages 1013-1025, October.
  25. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 106-126, March.
  26. Müller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi & Yehezkel, Yaron, 2009. "Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 373-393, May.
  27. Gil-Bazo, Javier & Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo, 2008. "When cheaper is better: Fee determination in the market for equity mutual funds," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 871-885, September.
  28. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 973-989, December.
  29. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2020. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 71(3), pages 429-457.
  30. Buehler, Benno & Schuett, Florian, 2014. "Certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 493-511.
  31. Patt, Anthony G. & Bowles, Hannah Riley & Cash, David W., 2006. "Mechanisms for Enhancing the Credibility of an Adviser: Prepayment and Aligned Incentives," Working Paper Series rwp06-010, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  32. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Advertising as signal jamming," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 91-113.
  33. Heiman, Amir & Ofir, Chezy, 2010. "The effects of imbalanced competition on demonstration strategies," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 175-187.
  34. Yi Qian & Qiang Gong & Yuxin Chen, 2015. "Untangling Searchable and Experiential Quality Responses to Counterfeits," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 522-538, July.
  35. Laurent Linnemer, 2011. "Caught In A Stranglehold? Advertising: What Else?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 63-80, January.
  36. Ana M. Fernandes & Caroline Paunov, 2013. "Does trade stimulate product quality upgrading?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1232-1264, November.
  37. Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat Purchases," CESifo Working Paper Series 2310, CESifo.
  38. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2009. "Hidden Talents: Entrepreneurship and Pareto‐Improving Private Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 901-934, September.
  39. Tsui, Hsiao-Chien, 2012. "Advertising, quality, and willingness-to-pay: Experimental examination of signaling theory," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1193-1203.
  40. Carroni, Elias & Mantovani, Andrea & Minniti, Antonio, 2023. "Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 238-253.
  41. Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007. "Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 94-120, January.
  42. Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Roy, Santanu, 2010. "Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 192-207, January.
  43. Soo, Kwok Tong & Elliott, Caroline, 2010. "Does price matter? Overseas students in UK higher education," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 553-565, August.
  44. Jonathan Willner, 2019. "Private Universities and NCAA D-III Athletics as a General Recruiting Tool," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(3), pages 293-307, August.
  45. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Imperfect competition and quality signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March.
  46. Eric Schmidbauer, 2016. "New and Improved?," Working Papers 2016-02, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
  47. P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Compliance," Working Papers 682, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  48. Yasunori Ishii, 2013. "Special Issue. Guest Editor: Zhihao Yu," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 571-584, August.
  49. Tingting Nian & Arun Sundararajan, 2022. "Social Media Marketing, Quality Signaling, and the Goldilocks Principle," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(2), pages 540-556, June.
  50. Fulan Wu, 2016. "Entry And Quality Signalling When Only Some Consumers Are Informed Of The Entrant'S Quality," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 297-310, April.
  51. Régis Chenavaz & Sajjad M. Jasimuddin, 2017. "An analytical model of the relationship between product quality and advertising," Post-Print hal-01685892, HAL.
  52. Cesaltina Pacheco Pires & Margarida Catalão-Lopes, 2011. "Signaling advertising by multiproduct firms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 403-425, May.
  53. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Private CSR Activities in Oligopolistic Markets: Is There Any Room for Regulation?," Working Papers 0816, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  54. Fernandes, Ana M. & Paunov, Caroline, 2009. "Does tougher import competition foster product quality upgrading ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4894, The World Bank.
  55. Muñoz-Garcia Félix & Espinola-Arredondo Ana, 2015. "The Signaling Role of Subsidies," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-22, January.
  56. Swagato Chatterjee, 2020. "Signalling Service Quality through Price and Certifications," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 21(1), pages 279-293, February.
  57. Wolfgang Gick, 2008. "Little Firms and Big Patents: A Model of Small‐Firm Patent Signaling," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(4), pages 913-935, December.
  58. Minghua Chen & Konstantinos Serfes & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2023. "Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 1-31, March.
  59. Yaron Yehezkel, 2008. "Signaling Quality in an Oligopoly When Some Consumers Are Informed," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(4), pages 937-972, December.
  60. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0613, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  61. Ding, Shujun & Jia, Chunxin & Wu, Zhenyu & Yuan, Wenlong, 2017. "Limited attention by lenders and small business debt financing: Advertising as attention grabber," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 69-82.
  62. Yi Qian & Qiang Gong & Yuxin Chen, 2013. "Untangling Searchable and Experiential Quality Responses to Counterfeits," NBER Working Papers 18784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  63. Ayca Kaya, 2013. "Dynamics of price and advertising as quality signals: anything goes," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1556-1564.
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