The Informational Role of Prices
We study the informational role of prices. To that end, we consider the framework of a dominant firm with a competitive fringe. When the competitive fringe is large enough, there exists a unique fully revealing equilibrium, in which the price conveys full information about the quality of the good to uninformed buyers. Deceiving the uninformed buyers by charging a high price and mimicking a high quality is not profitable when the competitive fringe is large enough. Since a higher price triggers more sales on the part of the competitive fringe, residual demand and thus profits are reduced. We also study the effect of asymmetric information and learning on the equilibrium outcomes. More uninformed buyers increases the price, reduces the quantity sold by the dominant firm, but increases the quantity sold by the competitive fringe.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2008|
|Date of revision:||Apr 2014|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan, 1988.
"High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality,"
808, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Roy, Santanu, 2010.
"Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 192-207, January.
- Judd, Kenneth L & Riordan, Michael H, 1994. "Price and Quality in a New Product Monopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 773-89, October.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980.
"On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
- Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
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