The Informational Benefit of Price Discrimination
We consider a monopoly supplying a homogeneous good to two separate markets with different demands. In one of the markets, some buyers do not know the quality of the good, but learn about it from observing prices. Under noisy demand, third-degree price discrimination is shown to alter the informational content of the price-signals received by the uninformed buyers. Specifically, discriminatory pricing have informational benefits over uniform pricing, i.e., the posterior beliefs of the uninformed buyers have a smaller bias and a lower variance.
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