IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lvl/lacicr/1423.html

Learning in a Perfectly Competitive Market

Author

Listed:
  • Leonard J. Mirman
  • Egas M. Salgueiro
  • Marc Santugini

Abstract

We study learning in perfect competition. A price-taking firm sells a good whose quality is unknown to some buyers. The uninformed buyers use the price to infer information about quality. The presence of noise on the supply prevents perfect learning. Even though the firm is a price-taker, information is disseminated though the price. The shape of the supply curve influences the amount of information contained in the price, which, in turn, affects the competitive equilibrium through the learning process of the uninformed buyers.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard J. Mirman & Egas M. Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2014. "Learning in a Perfectly Competitive Market," Cahiers de recherche 1423, CIRPEE.
    • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1423
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2014/CIRPEE14-23.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1976. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades Have Diverse Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 573-585, May.
    2. Grossman, Sanford, 1978. "Further results on the informational efficiency of competitive stock markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 81-101, June.
    3. Leonard J. Mirman & Neelam Jain, 2000. "Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(2), pages 333-353.
    4. Baron, David P, 1970. "Price Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 11(3), pages 463-480, October.
    5. Sanford Grossman, 1989. "The Informational Role of Prices," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262572141, December.
    6. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    7. Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 851-876, July.
    8. Mirman, Leonard J. & Salgueiro, Egas M. & Santugini, Marc, 2014. "Noisy signaling in monopoly," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 504-511.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2019. "The Informational Role of Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(2), pages 606-629, April.
    2. Leonard J. Mirman & Egas M. Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2015. "Noisy Learning in a Competitive Market with Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 1502, CIRPEE.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Catherine Gendron-Saulnier & Marc Santugini, 2013. "The Informational Benefit of Price Discrimination," Cahiers de recherche 13-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
    2. Diego García & Branko Urosevic, 2004. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Economics Working Papers 785, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Berta Marcos Ceron & Manuel Monge, 2024. "Luxury goods and services in recession periods. Time trends and persistence analysis," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(6), pages 588-595, December.
    4. Nezafat, Mahdi & Schroder, Mark, 2023. "The negative value of private information in illiquid markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    5. Li, Hao & Wang, Gaowang, 2025. "The Optimality of Gradualism in Economies with Financial Markets," MPRA Paper 125158, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Asriyan, Vladimir & Fuchs, William & Green, Brett, 2021. "Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    7. Agastya, Murali, 2003. "Insider Trading, Informational Effciency and Allocative Effciency," Working Papers 6, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    8. Shmuel Baruch & Xiaodi Zhang, 2022. "The Distortion in Prices Due to Passive Investing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6219-6234, August.
    9. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
    10. Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2019. "The Informational Role of Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(2), pages 606-629, April.
    11. Leonard J. Mirman & Egas M. Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2015. "Noisy Learning in a Competitive Market with Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 1502, CIRPEE.
    12. Michele Berardi, 2021. "Learning from prices: information aggregation and accumulation in an asset market," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-77, March.
    13. Michele Berardi, 2018. "Information aggregation and learning in a dynamic asset pricing model," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 241, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    14. Avdis, Efstathios, 2016. "Information tradeoffs in dynamic financial markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 568-584.
    15. Leonard J. Mirman & Egas M. Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2013. "Integrating Real and Financial Decisions of the Firm," Cahiers de recherche 1333, CIRPEE.
    16. Guillermo Llorente & Jiang Wang, 2020. "Trading and information in futures markets," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(8), pages 1231-1263, August.
    17. Gabriel Desgranges & Celine Rochon, 2008. "Conformism, Public News and Market Effciency," OFRC Working Papers Series 2008fe16, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    18. Leonard F.S. Wang & Ya‐Chin Wang, 2010. "Stackelberg real‐leader in an insider trading model," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 27(1), pages 30-46, March.
    19. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J., 2006. "Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 530-551, September.
    20. Nicolas S. Lambert & Michael Ostrovsky & Mikhail Panov, 2018. "Strategic Trading in Informationally Complex Environments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(4), pages 1119-1157, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1423. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Manuel Paradis (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cirpeca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.