Private CSR Activities in Oligopolistic Markets: Is there any room for Regulation?
The present paper examines the conditions under which the regulator can complement the provision of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities by private firms in an oligopolistic market. Our main finding is that if there is no credible information disclosure about SR characteristics of the firms' products to consumers, no firm will have incentives to undertake CSR effort in equilibrium. However, if the necessary information about the CSR aspects of each firm's product, otherwise unobservable, is made available to consumers through certification provided either by a profit-maximizing certifier or by the regulator, then both firms will have incentives to engage in CSR activities. Hence in equilibrium, consumers' surplus, firms profits and total welfare increase comparing to the benchmark case without CSR activities.
|Date of creation:||17 Jun 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Gallos - Rethymno 74100|
Phone: +30 831 77405
Fax: +30 831 77406
Web page: http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1992.
"Duopoly and Quality Standards,"
92.g, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Soham Baksi & Pinaki Bose, 2007. "Credence Goods, Efficient Labelling Policies, and Regulatory Enforcement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(2), pages 411-430, June.
- Marcus Alexander & Matthew C. Harding, 2003. "Self-regulation and the Certification of the European Information Economy The Case of e-Healthcare Information Provision," Economics Series Working Papers 154, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Bonroy, O. & Constantatos, C., 2007.
"On the use of labels in credence goods markets,"
200709, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2006. "Corporate Social Responsibility in Oligopoly," Working Papers 0707, University of Crete, Department of Economics, revised 15 Jan 2007.
- Paolo G. GARELLA & Emmanuel PETRAKIS, 2007.
"Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information,"
Departmental Working Papers
2007-12, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, August.
- Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information," Working Papers 0510, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
- P. Garella & P. Petrakis, 2004. "Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information," Working Papers 532, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. & Thisse, J. -F., 1979.
"Price competition, quality and income disparities,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 340-359, June.
- Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2003. "Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 419-445, 09.
- Catherine J. Morrison-Paul & Donald S. Siegel, 2006.
"Corporate Social Responsibility and Economic Performance,"
Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics
0605, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics.
- Catherine M. Paul & Donald Siegel, 2006. "Corporate social responsibility and economic performance," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 207-211, December.
- David P. Baron, 2003. "Private Politics," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 31-66, 03.
- Hackner, Jonas, 2000.
"A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 233-239, August.
- Häckner, Jonas, 1999. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Research Papers in Economics 1999:9, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Aleix Calveras & Juan-JosÉ Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2007. "Regulation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Activism," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 719-740, 09.
- David P. Baron, 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 7-45, 03.
- Aurora García-Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís, 2009. "Market Effects of Changes in Consumers' Social Responsibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 235-262, 03.
- Abagail McWilliams & Donald S. Siegel & Patrick M. Wright, 2005.
"Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications,"
Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics
0506, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics.
- Abagail McWilliams & Donald S. Siegel & Patrick M. Wright, 2006. "Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 1-18, 01.
- Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002.
"Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 907-930, September.
- Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "Advertising and Prices as Signals of Quality in a Regime of Price Rivalry," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9903, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0816. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kostis Pigounakis)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.