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Self-regulation and the Certification of the European Information Economy The Case of e-Healthcare Information Provision

Author

Listed:
  • Marcus Alexander
  • Matthew C. Harding
  • Department of Economics
  • MIT

Abstract

The trend towards Internet self-regulation is driven both by governments that feel reluctant to invest in direct regulation (because of freedom of speech concerns or high costs of monitoring and enforcement) and by the industry that is under the threat of rising public concerns over content (protection of minors, hate speech, e-business confidence). Our first model explores how firms voluntarily commit themselves to industry-wide or global codes of conduct and reporting initiatives. Then we analyze certification mechanisms through which firms can credibly signal their commitment to self-regulation schemes in the absence of government enforced regulatory standards and use the theoretical results to analyze the logic of current decision making in this area at the European level. Throughout, we illustrate these concepts with a large number of global examples and more detailed European level studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Alexander & Matthew C. Harding & Department of Economics & MIT, 2003. "Self-regulation and the Certification of the European Information Economy The Case of e-Healthcare Information Provision," Economics Series Working Papers 154, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lucie Bottega & Jenny De Freitas, 2009. "Public, Private and Nonprofit Regulation for Environmental Quality," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 105-123, March.
    2. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Private CSR Activities in Oligopolistic Markets: Is There Any Room for Regulation?," Working Papers 0816, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    3. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2013. "Certification of corporate social responsibility activities in oligopolistic markets," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(1), pages 282-309, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

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