How to Promote Quality Perception in Wine Markets: Brand Advertising or Geographical Indication?
In the context of the wine industry, we investigate producers' choice between geographical indications and brand advertising to convey information to consumers. Producers also decide whether or not to select an effort level for improving the quality of their products. We show that if this effort level is selected, a producer will prefer to rely on brand advertising for promoting its products and setting up its own reputation. Despite allowing the cost of promotion to be shared, a geographical indication does not sufficiently reward the effort to improve quality. Finally, the selection of both instruments by producers is examined.
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- Stephan Marette & Crespi & Schiavina, 1999.
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156523, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
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