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Citations for "Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency"

by Aghion, Philippe & Hermalin, Benjamin

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  1. Elul, Ronel, 2008. "Collateral, credit history, and the financial decelerator," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-88, January.
  2. Philip Bond & Andrew F. Newman, 2006. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-060, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  3. Grubb, Farley, 2000. "The Statutory Regulation of Colonial Servitude: An Incomplete-Contract Approach," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 42-75, January.
  4. Signorotti, Claudio, 2000. "Efficiency of legal restrictions on contracts in the presence of two signals," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 511-535, December.
  5. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4677, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Dessi, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital," IDEI Working Papers 465, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  7. De Geest, Gerrit, 2013. "N problems require N instruments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 42-57.
  8. Xi Li & Mingyi Hung & Larry Fauver & Alvaro Taboada, 2015. "Board Reforms and Firm Value: Worldwide Evidence," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2015-20, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Mar 2015.
  9. Michelle J. White, 2011. "Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law," NBER Working Papers 17237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Hviid, Morten, 1996. "Default rules and equilibrium selection of contract terms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 233-245, June.
  11. Vasconcelos, Luís, 2014. "Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 19-33.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
  13. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On discovery, restricting lawyers, and the settlement rate," DICE Discussion Papers 155, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  14. Franks, Julian & Sussman, Oren, 2005. "Financial innovations and corporate bankruptcy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-317, July.
  15. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2016. "Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 85-100.
  16. Danziger, Leif, 1995. "Discrete shocks and fixed duration of labor contracts," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 359-379, December.
  17. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Contract Law," NBER Working Papers 9696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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