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The Statutory Regulation of Colonial Servitude: An Incomplete-Contract Approach

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  • Grubb, Farley

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  • Grubb, Farley, 2000. "The Statutory Regulation of Colonial Servitude: An Incomplete-Contract Approach," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 42-75, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:37:y:2000:i:1:p:42-75
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin., 1990. "Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 90-140, University of California at Berkeley.
    2. Grubb, Farley, 1985. "The Market for Indentured Immigrants: Evidence on the Efficiency of Forward-Labor Contracting in Philadelphia, 1745–1773," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 855-868, December.
    3. Grubb Farley & Stitt Tony, 1994. "The Liverpool Emigrant Servant Trade and the Transition to Slave Labor in the Chesapeake, 1697-1707: Market Adjustments to War," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 376-405, July.
    4. Hamilton, Gillian, 1996. "The Market for Montreal Apprentices: Contract Length and Information," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 496-523, October.
    5. Kauffman, Kyle D. & Cribari-Neto, Francisco, 1995. "To pay or not to pay: Positive incentives as a calibrating device in the white indenture system," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 257-269.
    6. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1993. "Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 230-255, October.
    7. Grubb, Farley, 1988. "The Auction of Redemptioner Servants, Philadelphia, 1771–1804: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 583-603, September.
    8. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-932, September.
    9. Grubb, Farley, 2000. "The Transatlantic Market for British Convict Labor," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 94-122, March.
    10. James M. Malcomson, 1997. "Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1916-1957, December.
    11. Grubb, Farley, 1994. "The End of European Immigrant Servitude in the United States: An Economic Analysis of Market Collapse, 1772–1835," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 794-824, December.
    12. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    13. Hamilton, Gillian, 1995. "Enforcement In Apprenticeship Contracts: Were Runaways a Serious Problem? Evidence from Montreal," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(3), pages 551-574, September.
    14. Galenson, David W., 1984. "The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 1-26, March.
    15. Grubb, Farley, 1985. "The incidence of servitude in trans-Atlantic migration, 1771-1804," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 316-339, July.
    16. Aghion, Philippe & Hermalin, Benjamin, 1990. "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 381-409, Fall.
    17. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    18. Galenson, David W, 1981. "The Market Evaluation of Human Capital: The Case of Indentured Servitude," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(3), pages 446-467, June.
    19. Grubb, Farley, 1986. "Redemptioner Immigration to Pennsylvania: Evidence on Contract Choice and Profitability," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 407-418, June.
    20. H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Howard Bodenhorn, 2003. "Just and Reasonable Treatment: Racial Treatment in the Terms of Pauper Apprenticeship in Antebellum Maryland," NBER Working Papers 9752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Wallis, Patrick, 2008. "Apprenticeship and Training in Premodern England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 832-861, September.
    3. Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 83(2), pages 227-253.
    4. repec:ehl:lserod:22515 is not listed on IDEAS

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