IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Statutory Regulation of Colonial Servitude: An Incomplete-Contract Approach

  • Grubb, Farley

No abstract is available for this item.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFJ-45F4HNG-6/2/5e9c0a2ef59f7002961a3ec9696b5781
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.

Volume (Year): 37 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 42-75

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:37:y:2000:i:1:p:42-75
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
  2. Malcomson, J.M., 1997. "Contracts, hold-up and labor markets," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9703, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  3. Aghion, Philippe & Hermalin, Benjamin, 1990. "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 381-409, Fall.
  4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-32, September.
  5. Grubb, Farley, 1985. "The Market for Indentured Immigrants: Evidence on the Efficiency of Forward-Labor Contracting in Philadelphia, 1745–1773," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(04), pages 855-868, December.
  6. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1993. "Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 230-55, October.
  7. Galenson, David W., . "The Market Evaluation of Human Capital: The Case of Indentured Servitude," Working Papers 316, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  8. Grubb, Farley, 1994. "The End of European Immigrant Servitude in the United States: An Economic Analysis of Market Collapse, 1772–1835," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(04), pages 794-824, December.
  9. Hamilton, Gillian, 1996. "The Market for Montreal Apprentices: Contract Length and Information," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 496-523, October.
  10. Galenson, David W., 1984. "The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(01), pages 1-26, March.
  11. H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
  12. Hamilton, Gillian, 1995. "Enforcement In Apprenticeship Contracts: Were Runaways a Serious Problem? Evidence from Montreal," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(03), pages 551-574, September.
  13. Kauffman, Kyle D. & Cribari-Neto, Francisco, 1995. "To pay or not to pay: Positive incentives as a calibrating device in the white indenture system," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 257-269.
  14. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
  15. Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin., 1990. "Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 90-140, University of California at Berkeley.
  16. Grubb, Farley, 1986. "Redemptioner Immigration to Pennsylvania: Evidence on Contract Choice and Profitability," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(02), pages 407-418, June.
  17. Grubb, Farley, 1988. "The Auction of Redemptioner Servants, Philadelphia, 1771–1804: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(03), pages 583-603, September.
  18. Grubb Farley & Stitt Tony, 1994. "The Liverpool Emigrant Servant Trade and the Transition to Slave Labor in the Chesapeake, 1697-1707: Market Adjustments to War," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 376-405, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:37:y:2000:i:1:p:42-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.