Protecting privacy amid questions of economic efficiency and egalitarianism
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Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- K30 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - General
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
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