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Bonus Taxes and International Competition for Bank Managers

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  • Gietl, Daniel
  • Haufler, Andreas

Abstract

This paper analyzes the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Bonus taxes make incentive pay more costly for national banks and lead to an outflow of managers, lower effort and less risk-taking in equilibrium. The international competition in bonus taxes may feature a `race to the bottom', or a `race to the top', depending on whether bankers exert a positive or a negative fiscal value on their home government. The latter can arise when governments bail out banks in the case of default, and bankers take excessive risks as a result of incentive pay.

Suggested Citation

  • Gietl, Daniel & Haufler, Andreas, 2016. "Bonus Taxes and International Competition for Bank Managers," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145615, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145615
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Haufler & Yukihiro Nishimura, 2023. "Taxing mobile and overconfident top earners," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(4), pages 913-947, August.
    2. Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 371-402.
    3. Gietl, Daniel, 2018. "Overconfidence and Bailouts," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 132, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Gietl, Daniel & Haufler, Andreas, 2018. "Bonus taxes and international competition for bank managers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 41-60.
    5. Gietl, Daniel & Kassner, Bernhard, 2020. "Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 202-222.
    6. Colonnello, Stefano & Koetter, Michael & Wagner, Konstantin, 2023. "Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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