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Bank Bonuses and Bail-Outs

Author

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  • Hendrik Hakenes

    () (University of Bonn, Finance Department)

  • Isabel Schnabel

    () (Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz)

Abstract

This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers’ liability can be counterproductive.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2013. "Bank Bonuses and Bail-Outs," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2013_03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ing-Haw Cheng & Harrison Hong & Jose Scheinkman, 2010. "Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking," NBER Chapters,in: Market Institutions and Financial Market Risk National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    3. Reint Gropp & Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2011. "Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 2084-2120.
    4. Christina E. Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham, 2013. "Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-taking in the Banking Industry," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 653-690.
    5. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Gropp, Reint & Köhler, Matthias, 2010. "Bank owners or bank managers: who is keen on risk? Evidence from the financial crisis," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-013, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. John, Kose & Mehran, Hamid & Qian, Yiming, 2010. "Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 383-399, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Li & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schröder, Michael & Xu, Xian, 2019. "Politicians’ promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 63-94.
    2. repec:eee:jfinin:v:33:y:2018:i:c:p:83-97 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gietl, Daniel, 2018. "Overconfidence and Bailouts," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 132, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Bailouts, Bonuses and Bankers' Short-Termism," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    5. Gete, Pedro & Gomez, Juan Pedro, 2017. "Dealing with Overleverage: Restricting Leverage vs. Restricting Variable Compensation," MPRA Paper 80642, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Li Wang & Lukas Menkhoff & Michael Schröder & Xian Xu, 2018. "Politicians' Promotion Incentives and Bank Risk Exposure," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1771, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    7. repec:sgh:gosnar:y:2016:i:6:p:43-68 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2011. "Taxation and regulation of bonus pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58192, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. repec:eee:eecrev:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:41-60 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Efing, Matthias & Hau, Harald & Kampkötter, Patrick & Steinbrecher, Johannes, 2015. "Incentive pay and bank risk-taking: Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss banks," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(S1), pages 123-140.
    11. repec:kap:regeco:v:53:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-018-9352-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Kooths, Stefan & Plödt, Martin & van Roye, Björn & Scheide, Joachim, 2014. "Makroprudenzielle Finanzmarktpolitik: Nationale Handlungsoptionen im Euroraum," Kiel Discussion Papers 541/542, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    13. Chaiporn Vithessonthi, 2016. "The Consequences of Bank Loan Growth: Evidence from Asia," PIER Discussion Papers 19., Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research, revised Feb 2016.
    14. Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens & Gern, Klaus-Jürgen & Groll, Dominik & Jannsen, Nils & Kooths, Stefan & Plödt, Martin & Schwarzmüller, Tim & van Roye, Björn & Scheide, Joachim, 2014. "Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik bei einer anhaltenden monetären Expansion," Kieler Beiträge zur Wirtschaftspolitik 5, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    15. Beck, Thorsten & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay, 2016. "Financial Regulation in Europe: Foundations and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 11147, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. repec:kap:jfsres:v:53:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10693-018-0291-z is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Allen, Franklin & Goldstein, Itay & Jagtiani, Julapa, 2018. "The Interplay between Financial Regulations, Resilience, and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 12861, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Engert Andreas & Goldlücke Susanne, 2017. "Why Agents Need Discretion: The Business Judgment Rule as Optimal Standard of Care," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-38, March.
    19. Eufinger, Christian & Gill, Andrej, 2016. "Incentive-based capital requirements," SAFE Working Paper Series 9 [rev.], Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    20. repec:eee:riibaf:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:1489-1503 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Jokivuolle, Esa & Keppo, Jussi & Yuan, Xuchuan, 2015. "Bonus caps, deferrals and bankers' risk-taking," Research Discussion Papers 5/2015, Bank of Finland.
    22. Gietl, Daniel & Haufler, Andreas, 2018. "Bonus taxes and international competition for bank managers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 41-60.
    23. Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2018. "Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 206-242, April.
    24. repec:bof:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201503041096 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Thanassoulis, John & Tanaka, Misa, 2015. "Bankers' pay and excessive risk," Bank of England working papers 558, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bonus payments; bank bail-outs; bank management compensation; risk-shifting; underinvestment; limited and unlimited liability;

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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