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do more transparent government govern better?

  • Islam, Roumeen
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    The author explores the link between information flows and governance or institutional quality. Economic theory expounds on the importance of information on economic outcomes either through its direct effect on prices and quantities or through its effect on other factors such as institutions and the quality of governance. She shows that countries with better information flows also govern better. Two kinds of indicators are used to assess better information flows. One index is based on the existence of freedom of information laws. A second index called the"transparency"index measures the frequency with which economic data are published in countries around the world. Empirical analysis shows that countries which have better information flows as measured by both indicators have better quality governance.

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    File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/07/08/000094946_03062104301553/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
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    Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3077.

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    Date of creation: 30 Jun 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3077
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    8. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 28, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
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    16. Bruce Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1987. "Money, Imperfect Information and Economic Fluctuations," NBER Working Papers 2188, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. George J. Stigler, 1961. "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 213.
    18. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    19. Stiglitz, J.E., 1988. "Sharecropping," Papers 11, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
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