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Contraintes institutionnelles et règlementaires et le secteur informel à Djibouti
[Institutional and regulatory constraints and the informal sector in Djibouti]

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  • Mahamoud, Ismael

Abstract

This research seeks to detect the institutional and regulatory constraints that limit the development of informal units in Djibouti by both the macroeconomic and microeconomic analysis. The review shows that institutional habits (corruption, going right) in regulation created transaction costs and force small businesses to take refuge in the informal sector. A regression model shows that the quality of justice (as measured by this indicator of Rule of Law of the World Bank) is a determining variable in explaining the weight of the non-observed economy and hence the informal sector in GDP official. The dynamics of micro-enterprises is approached from 2 surveys (2001 and 2005) on the same sample. The analysis of mobility through transition matrices reveals the existence of three thresholds (1 employee, 2-5 employees, 6-9 employees and 10 employees and more) and not only one single threshold, albeit it confirms the thesis of «missing-middle». The discriminating factor analysis indicates that the law is a crucial variable that explains the apparent blocking of micro-enterprises beyond 6 to 9 employees. Finally, the 2007 survey on the money transfer activities (hawalas) shows that these institutions have a significant impact on the macroeconomic level and suggests that their usefulness and specificity should be taken into account in order to integrate this banking device within the formal financial system.

Suggested Citation

  • Mahamoud, Ismael, 2008. "Contraintes institutionnelles et règlementaires et le secteur informel à Djibouti
    [Institutional and regulatory constraints and the informal sector in Djibouti]
    ," MPRA Paper 48886, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48886
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48886/1/MPRA_paper_48886.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Moustapha Aman & Nikolay Nenovsky & Ismeal Mahamoud, 2014. "Le système informel de transferts de fonds et le mécanisme automatique du Currency Board : Complémentarité ou antagonisme ?," Working Papers halshs-01012133, HAL.
    2. Moustapha AMAN & Ismeal MAHAMOUD & Nikolay NENOVSKY, 2013. "Le système informel de transferts de fonds et le mécanisme automatique du Currency Board : complémentarité ou antagonisme ? Le cas des transferts des hawalas à Djibouti," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2249, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contrat; corruption; coût de transaction; économie non observée; hawalas; légalité; institutions; micro-entreprise; «missing-middle»; opportunisme; secteur informel;

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O5 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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