Motivation crowding-out: Is there a risk for science?
Performance related pay is playing an increasing role in scientific research. This development, which applies the results of standard economic theories (the principal-agent model), aims at increasing incentives and thus productivity in science. The objective of this paper is then to cross the works of various economic fields, including those in economics of science and those on the theories of individual motivation, in order to explore the consequences of this development on scientists’ incentives and to focus on its possible "perverse effects". Two key elements emerge from our literature review: firstly, the motivations of researchers are complex and multiple and do not depend solely on their salary level; secondly, the literature on the theories of incentives identifies a risk that increasing monetary incentives, paradoxically, reduce the overall level of staff motivation, especially when there exist other sources of motivation (as is usually the case in science). According to this literature there may therefore exist a "hidden cost" to financially reward scientists. These teachings lead us to construct empirically testable propositions about the implications of performance related pay in science and the conditions of emergence of a motivation crowding-out effect.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: PEGE. 61, Aven. de la Forêt-Noire 67000 Strasbourg|
Phone: +33 3 68 85 20 69
Fax: +33 3 68 85 20 70
Web page: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Houser, Daniel & Xiao, Erte & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon, 2008.
"When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 509-532, March.
- Daniel Houser & Erte Xiao & Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, 2005. "When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non- Cooperation," Experimental 0502001, EconWPA, revised 18 Feb 2005.
- Daniel Houser & Erte Xiao & Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, 2005. "When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non- cooperation," Experimental 0503001, EconWPA.
- Claudia Curi & Cinzia Daraio & Patrick Llerena, 2012.
"University technology transfer: how (in)efficient are French universities?,"
Cambridge Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 629-654.
- Claudia Curi & Cinzia Daraio & Maria Patrick Llerena, 2012. "University Technology Transfer: How (in-)efficient are French universities?," DIS Technical Reports 2012-02, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
- Claudia Curi & Cinzia Daraio & Patrick Llerena, 2012. "University Technology Transfer: How (in-)efficient are French universities?," Working Papers of BETA 2012-02, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2006.
"Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated".
"Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model,"
IEW - Working Papers
191, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 453-474, October.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers in Economics 335, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 4464, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model," Munich Reprints in Economics 20657, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Olivier Cardi & Romain Restout, 2012.
"Unanticipated vs. Anticipated Tax Reforms in a Two-Sector Open Economy,"
Working Papers of BETA
2012-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Olivier Cardi & Romain Restout, 2014. "Unanticipated vs. Anticipated Tax Reforms in a Two-Sector Open Economy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 373-406, April.
- James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben, 1994. "The Distribution of Public Sector Wage Premia: New Evidence Using Quantile Regression Methods," NBER Working Papers 4734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Meixing Dai, 2012.
"Static and Dynamic Effects of Central Bank Transparency,"
Working Papers of BETA
2012-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Meixing Dai, 2016. "Static And Dynamic Effects Of Central Bank Transparency," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 55-78, 01.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2012-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.