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La construction d’une sanction: Le cas des pénalités de retard dans les centres de loisirs de la commune d’Asnières-sur-Seine

Author

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  • Marc Deschamps

    () (LCE - Laboratoire Chrono-environnement - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté)

  • Julien Pénin

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper presents a natural experiment where a French city decided to fine parents who pick up their children late in municipal day-care centers. After five months of implementation of this scheme, contrary to the findings of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), the number of delay has been significantly decreased. We attribute this difference to three specific features of the French city sanction system: 1/ it has not been imposed top-down but built after implication of all stakeholders, including parents (involved in a working group); 2/ Communication towards parents in order to justify the fine focused on non-financial elements such as the problems that delay induce for day-care centers personals rather than on the financial costs of delays; 3/ the fine is proportional to the length of the delay and to the income of the parents and, in extreme cases, there is the possibility to exclude children.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Deschamps & Julien Pénin, 2015. "La construction d’une sanction: Le cas des pénalités de retard dans les centres de loisirs de la commune d’Asnières-sur-Seine," Working Papers hal-01377914, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377914
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01377914
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
    3. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
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    7. Jean-Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-deterrent," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 135-156, March.
    8. Houser, Daniel & Xiao, Erte & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon, 2008. "When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 509-532, March.
    9. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    10. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810.
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    14. Pommerehne, Werner W & Hart, Albert & Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Tax Morale, Tax Evasion and the Choice of Policy Instruments in Different Political Systems," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 52-69.
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    Keywords

    incitations; effet d’éviction motivationnel; expérience naturelle; amende; sanction;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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