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Research Governance in Academia: Are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings?

  • Margit Osterloh
  • Bruno S. Frey

Peer reviews and rankings today are the backbone of research governance, but recently came under scrutiny. They take explicitly or implicitly agency theory as a theoretical basis. The emerging psychological economics opens a new perspective. As scholarly research is a mainly curiosity driven endeavor, we include intrinsic motivation and supportive feedback by the peers as important determinants of scholarly behavior. We discuss whether a stronger emphasis on selection and socialization offers an alternative to the present regime of academic rankings.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2797.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2797
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