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Academic rankings and research governance

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  • Margit Osterloh
  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

Academic rankings today are the backbone of research governance, which seem to fit the aims of �new public management� on the one side and the idea of the �republic of science� on the other side. Nevertheless rankings recently came under scrutiny. We discuss advantages and disadvantages of academic rankings, in particular their unintended negative consequences on the research process. To counterbalance these negative consequences we suggest (a) rigorous selection and socialization, and (b) downplaying the impact of rankings in order to reconcile academic self-governance with accountability to the public.

Suggested Citation

  • Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, 2010. "Academic rankings and research governance," IEW - Working Papers 482, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:482
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    1. Gérard Charreaux, 2011. "«Cité ou oublié»:les supports de la notoriété des professeurs en sciences de gestion vus à travers Google Scholar," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(4), pages 129-166, December.
    2. Bruno S. Frey, 2010. "Withering Academia?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3209, CESifo.
    3. Katja Rost & Bruno S. Frey, 2011. "Quantitative and Qualitative Rankings of Scholars," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 63(1), pages 63-91, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Peer reviews; rankings; research governance; psychological economics; new public management; economics of science; control theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • L38 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Policy

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