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Distressed Assets and Fiscal-Monetary Support: Are AMCs a Third Way?

Author

Listed:
  • Reiner Martin

    (National Bank of Slovakia)

  • Edward O’Brien

    (European Central Bank)

  • M. Udara Peiris

    (Oberlin College)

  • Dimitrios P. Tsomocos

    (University of Oxford)

Abstract

Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8, Ireland, Slovenia, and Spain set up public Asset Management Companies (AMCs), purchasing delinquent loans equal to 44%, 16%, and 10% of GDP, respectively. Though deemed successful, it’s unclear if this was de facto traditional capital and liquidity support. We show that AMCs have a systematic advantage in reducing pecuniary externalities and costs associated with loan delinquencies. AMCs enhance average returns to bank lending, promoting additional lending (bank lending channel) and improving corporate borrowers’ balance sheets (balance sheet channel). The welfare gains of well-designed and well-managed AMCs are between 0.2% and 0.5% of steadystate consumption, independent of whether they are financed through fiscal transfers or sterilized monetary transfers; AMCs can complement traditional fiscal and monetary policies in managing financial crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Reiner Martin & Edward O’Brien & M. Udara Peiris & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2025. "Distressed Assets and Fiscal-Monetary Support: Are AMCs a Third Way?," Working and Discussion Papers WP 2/2025, Research Department, National Bank of Slovakia.
  • Handle: RePEc:svk:wpaper:1117
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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