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Debt, recovery rates and the Greek dilemma

Author

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  • Goodhart, C.A.E.
  • Peiris, M.U.
  • Tsomocos, D.P.

Abstract

Most discussions of the Greek debt overhang have focussed on the implications for Greece. We show that when additional funds released to the debtor (Greece), via debt restructuring, are used efficiently in pursuit of a practicable business plan, then both debtor and creditor can benefit. We examine a dynamic two country model calibrated to Greek and German economies and support two-steady states, one with endogenous default and one without, depending on creditors’ expectations. In the default steady state, debt forgiveness lowers the volatility of both German and Greek consumption whereas demanding higher recovery rates has the opposite effect. In a second order approximation of the model, conditional welfare analysis shows that a policy of immediate leniency followed by harsher terms as the economy grows is beneficial to both creditors and debtors.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhart, C.A.E. & Peiris, M.U. & Tsomocos, D.P., 2018. "Debt, recovery rates and the Greek dilemma," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 265-278.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:36:y:2018:i:c:p:265-278
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2018.03.007
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    Cited by:

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    2. Xuan Wang, 2019. "When Do Currency Unions Benefit From Default ?," 2019 Papers pwa938, Job Market Papers.
    3. Xuan Wang, 2021. "Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-009/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Xuan Wang, 2020. "A Macro-Financial Perspective to Analyse Maturity Mismatch and Default," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-064/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Mikhail Andreev & M. Udara Peiris & Aleksandr Shirobokov & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2019. "Macroprudential Policy and Financial (In)Stability Analysis in the Russian Federation," Russian Journal of Money and Finance, Bank of Russia, vol. 78(3), pages 3-37, September.
    6. Wang, Xuan, 2023. "A macro-financial perspective to analyse maturity mismatch and default," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    7. Paritosh Chandra Sinha, 2021. "Attention to the Election-Economics-Politics (EEP) Nexus in the Indian Stock Markets," The Review of Finance and Banking, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti, Romania / Facultatea de Finante, Asigurari, Banci si Burse de Valori / Catedra de Finante, vol. 13(1), pages 7-32, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    F34; G15; G18; Debt; Default; Renegotiation; Business cycles; Open economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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