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The Impact of Redistribution Mechanisms in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results

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  • Becchetti, Leonardo

    () (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

  • Salustri, Francesco

    () (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

  • Pelligra, Vittorio

    () (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

Abstract

We use the Vote-with-the-Wallet game (VWG) to model socially or environmentally responsible consumption, an increasingly relevant but still under-researched phenomenon. Based on a theoretical model outlining game equilibria and the parametric interval of the related multiplayer prisoners’ dilemma (PD) we evaluate with a controlled lab experiment players’ behavior in the game and test the effects of an ex post redistribution mechanism between defectors and cooperators. Our findings document that the redistribution mechanism interrupts cooperation decay and stabilizes the share of cooperators at a level significantly higher, even though inferior to the Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Becchetti, Leonardo & Salustri, Francesco & Pelligra, Vittorio, 2015. "The Impact of Redistribution Mechanisms in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results," AICCON Working Papers 143-2015, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:aiccon:2015_143
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leonardo Becchetti & Maurizio Fiaschetti & Francesco Salustri, 2017. "The Impact of Cash Mobs in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results," CEIS Research Paper 401, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 18 Apr 2017.
    2. L. Becchetti & V. Pelligra & S.F. Taurino, 2015. "Other-Regarding Preferences and Reciprocity: Insights from Experimental Findings and Satisfaction Data," Working Paper CRENoS 201514, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    3. L. Becchetti & V. Pelligra & F. Salustri & A. Vásquez, 2016. "Gender differences in Socially Responsible Consumption. An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper CRENoS 201603, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    vote with the wallet; prisoner’s dilemma; lab experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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