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Ecological transition:a game theoretic and statistical challenge

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  • Leonardo Becchetti

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  • Leonardo Becchetti, 2023. "Ecological transition:a game theoretic and statistical challenge," RIEDS - Rivista Italiana di Economia, Demografia e Statistica - The Italian Journal of Economic, Demographic and Statistical Studies, SIEDS Societa' Italiana di Economia Demografia e Statistica, vol. 77(4), pages 4-12, October-D.
  • Handle: RePEc:ite:iteeco:230401
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leonardo Becchetti & Vittorio Pelligra & Francesco Salustri, 2018. "The impact of redistribution mechanisms in the vote with the wallet game: experimental results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(4), pages 595-619, December.
    2. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    3. Leonardo Becchetti & Francesco Salustri, 2019. "The Vote with the Wallet Game: Responsible Consumerism as a Multiplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-22, February.
    4. Howarth, Richard B. & Farber, Stephen, 2002. "Accounting for the value of ecosystem services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 421-429, June.
    5. William Nordhaus, 2015. "Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1339-1370, April.
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