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The Vote With the Wallet as a Multiplayer Prisoner's Dilemma

Listed author(s):
  • Becchetti, Leonardo

    ()

    (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

  • Salustri, Francesco

    ()

    (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

Socially responsible consumers and investors are increasingly using their consumption and saving choices as a “vote with the wallet” to award companies which are at vanguard in reconciling the creation of economic value with social and environmental sustainability. In our paper we model the vote with the wallet as a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma, outline equilibria and possible solutions to the related coordination failure problem, apply our analysis to domains in which the vote with the wallet is empirically more relevant, and provide policy suggestions.

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File URL: http://www.aiccon.it/pubblicazione/141-the-vote-with-the-wallet-as-multiplayer-prisoners-dilemma/
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Paper provided by Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit in its series AICCON Working Papers with number 141-2015.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 08 Sep 2015
Handle: RePEc:ris:aiccon:2015_141
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  1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
  2. Leonardo Becchetti & Giorgio Federico & Nazaria Solferino, 2011. "Erratum to: What to do in globalised economies if global governance is missing? The vicarious role of competition in social responsibility," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(4), pages 439-439, December.
  3. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2007. "Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1645-1663, September.
  4. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
  5. Leonardo Becchetti & Rocco Ciciretti & Ambrogio Dalò & Stefano Herzel, 2015. "Socially responsible and conventional investment funds: performance comparison and the global financial crisis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(25), pages 2541-2562, May.
  6. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
  7. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2003. "Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 419-445, September.
  8. Redfern, Andy. & Snedker, Paul., 2002. "Creating market opportunities for small enterprises : experiences of the fair trade movement," ILO Working Papers 993570693402676, International Labour Organization.
  9. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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