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Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Becchetti, Leonardo

    () (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

  • Corrado, Germana

    () (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

  • Pelligra, Vittorio

    () (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

  • Rossetti, Fiammetta

    () (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

Abstract

We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma by comparing results from a direct (satisfaction based) and an indirect (choice based) approach. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The combination of a legality frame plus a conformity information design reduces further the relative preference (satisfaction) for the non-cooperative choice for such players. Our findings support the hypothesis that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design.

Suggested Citation

  • Becchetti, Leonardo & Corrado, Germana & Pelligra, Vittorio & Rossetti, Fiammetta, 2016. "Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma," AICCON Working Papers 145-2016, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:aiccon:2016_145
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    3. L. Becchetti & V. Pelligra & S.F. Taurino, 2015. "Other-Regarding Preferences and Reciprocity: Insights from Experimental Findings and Satisfaction Data," Working Paper CRENoS 201514, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    4. Becchetti, Leonardo & Salustri, Francesco, 2015. "The Vote With the Wallet as a Multiplayer Prisoner's Dilemma," AICCON Working Papers 141-2015, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
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    6. Leonardo Becchetti & Vittorio Pelligra & Fiammetta Rossetti, 2016. "The Corporate Legality Game. A Lab Experiment on The Impact of Policies, Frames and Information," CEIS Research Paper 390, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 11 Jun 2016.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; Corruption; Laboratoty Experiment; Legality Game; Redistribution; Conformity;

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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