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Other regarding preferences and reciprocity:insights from experimental findings and satisfaction data

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We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants' behaviour after a multiperiod "hybrid contribution" multiplayer prisoner's dilemma called the "vote with the wallet" game. Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we define as strong cooperators) are significantly more satisfied with the game in proportion to their cooperative choice. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other players' behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other players' behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity argument may account for the combination of the observed experimental and satisfaction findings.

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  • Leonardo Becchetti & Vittorio Pelligra & Serena F. Taurino, 2016. "Other regarding preferences and reciprocity:insights from experimental findings and satisfaction data," CEIS Research Paper 363, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 01 Feb 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:363
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    1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    2. Leonardo Becchetti & Vittorio Pelligra & Francesco Salustri, 2018. "The impact of redistribution mechanisms in the vote with the wallet game: experimental results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(4), pages 595-619, December.
    3. Becchetti, Leonardo & Salustri, Francesco, 2015. "The Vote With the Wallet as a Multiplayer Prisoner's Dilemma," AICCON Working Papers 141-2015, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    4. Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
    5. Bohnet, Iris & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2004. "Trust, risk and betrayal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 467-484, December.
    6. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009. "Dynamic psychological games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January.
    7. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
    8. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    9. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    10. Couture, Toby & Gagnon, Yves, 2010. "An analysis of feed-in tariff remuneration models: Implications for renewable energy investment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 955-965, February.
    11. Becchetti, Leonardo & Degli Antoni, Giacomo, 2010. "The sources of happiness: Evidence from the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 498-509, August.
    12. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nazaria Solferino & Viviana Solferino & Serena F. Taurino, 2018. "The economics analysis of a Q-learning model of cooperation with punishment and risk taking preferences," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 13(3), pages 601-613, October.
    2. Leonardo Becchetti & Germana Corrado & Vittorio Pelligra & Fiammetta Rossetti, 2016. "Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma: Comparing the Direct and Indirect Approach," CEIS Research Paper 372, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 25 Mar 2016.
    3. Becchetti, Leonardo & Corrado, Germana & Pelligra, Vittorio & Rossetti, Fiammetta, 2016. "Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma," AICCON Working Papers 145-2016, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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