Design of Macro-prudential Stress Tests
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- repec:eee:jetheo:v:177:y:2018:i:c:p:34-69 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:eee:jfinec:v:131:y:2019:i:2:p:251-268 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shapiro, Joel & Zeng, Jing, 2019. "Stress Testing and Bank Lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 13907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BAN-2018-09-10 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2018-09-10 (Central Banking)
- NEP-IFN-2018-09-10 (International Finance)
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