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Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Benoit

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Edouard Colliard

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Christophe Hurlin

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Christophe Pérignon

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We review the extensive literature on systemic risk and connect it to the current regulatory debate. While we take stock of the achievements of this rapidly growing field, we identify a gap between two main approaches. The first one studies different sources of systemic risk in isolation, uses confidential data, and inspires targeted but complex regulatory tools. The second approach uses market data to produce global measures which are not directly connected to any particular theory, but could support a more efficient regulation. Bridging this gap will require encompassing theoretical models and improved data disclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Benoit & Jean-Edouard Colliard & Christophe Hurlin & Christophe Pérignon, 2015. "Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk," Working Papers halshs-01142014, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01142014
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2577961
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01142014v2
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    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01142014v2/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; Financial Crises; Too-Big-To-Fail ; Macroprudential Regulation; Systemically Important Financial Institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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