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The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests

Author

Listed:
  • Dmitry Orlov
  • Pavel Zryumov
  • Andrzej Skrzypacz

Abstract

We study the design of stress tests that provide information about aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in banks’ portfolios and impose contingent capital requirements. In the optimal static test, an adverse scenario fails all weak and some strong banks, limiting the stigma of failure. Sequential tests outperform static tests. Under natural conditions, the optimal sequential test consists of a precautionary recapitalization, followed by a scenario that fails only weak banks, similar to TARP in 2008, followed by SCAP in 2009. Our results also shed light on the Federal Reserve’s decision to test the banks twice in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Orlov & Pavel Zryumov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2023. "The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(11), pages 4460-4501.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:36:y:2023:i:11:p:4460-4501.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhad040
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    Cited by:

    1. Moreno, Diego & Takalo, Tuomas, 2021. "Precision of public information disclosures, banks' stability and welfare," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2021, Bank of Finland.
    2. Cong, Lin William & Grenadier, Steven R. & Hu, Yunzhi, 2020. "Dynamic interventions and informational linkages," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 1-15.
    3. Fiordelisi, Franco & Ricci, Ornella & Santilli, Gianluca, 2025. "Spotlight on physical risk: Assessing the banks' stock reaction to the ECB climate stress test," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    4. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2019. "Censorship as Optimal Persuasion," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201903, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 05 Mar 2020.
    5. Ana Babus & Maryam farboodi, 2019. "The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity," 2019 Meeting Papers 1508, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Tirupam Goel & Isha Agarwal, 2021. "Limits of stress-test based bank regulation," BIS Working Papers 953, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. White, Lucy & Walther, Ansgar, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    9. Ozan Candogan & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver," Papers 2101.10431, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    10. Ding, Haina & Guembel, Alexander & Ozanne, Alessio, 2020. "Market Information in Banking Supervision: The Role of Stress Test Design," TSE Working Papers 20-1144, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    11. Gu, Jiadong, 2023. "Optimal stress tests and liquidation cost," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    12. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    13. Agarwal, Isha & Goel, Tirupam, 2024. "Bank regulation and supervision: A symbiotic relationship," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    14. Leitner, Yaron & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2019. "Regulating a model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 251-268.
    15. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2018. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," 2018 Meeting Papers 566, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Joel Shapiro & Jing Zeng, 2024. "Stress Testing and Bank Lending," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(4), pages 1265-1314.
    17. Chen, Yehning & Hasan, Iftekhar & Takalo, Tuomas, 2025. "Bank transparency, asset and liquidity risks," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/2025, Bank of Finland.
    18. Cuzzola, Angelo & Barbieri, Claudio & Hałaj, Grzegorz, 2025. "Gaming the test? Window-dressing and portfolio similarity around the EU-wide stress tests," Working Paper Series 3094, European Central Bank.
    19. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    20. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    21. Zanin, Luca & Calabrese, Raffaella & Thorburn, Connor Innes, 2024. "Climate stress testing for mortgage default probability," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 95(PB).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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