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Design of Macro-prudential Stress Tests

Author

Listed:
  • Orlov, Dmitry

    (University of Rochester)

  • Zryumov, Pavel

    (University of PA)

  • Skrzypacz, Andrzej

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

We study the design of macro-prudential stress tests and capital requirements. The tests provide information about correlation in banks portfolios. The regulator chooses contingent capital requirements that create a liquidity buffer in case of a fire sale. The optimal stress test discloses information partially: when systemic risk is low, capital requirements reflect full information. When systemic risk is high, the regulator pools information and requires all banks to hold precautionary liquidity. With heterogeneous banks, weak banks determine level of transparency and strong banks are often required to hold excess capital when systemic risk is high. Moreover, dynamic disclosure and capital adjustments can improve welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Orlov, Dmitry & Zryumov, Pavel & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2017. "Design of Macro-prudential Stress Tests," Research Papers 3548, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:3548
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    Cited by:

    1. Tirupam Goel & Isha Agarwal, 2021. "Limits of stress-test based bank regulation," BIS Working Papers 953, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    3. Ana Babus & Maryam farboodi, 2019. "The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity," 2019 Meeting Papers 1508, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. White, Lucy & Walther, Ansgar, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    6. Moreno, Diego & Takalo, Tuomas, 2021. "Precision of public information disclosures, banks' stability and welfare," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2021, Bank of Finland.
    7. Leitner, Yaron & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2019. "Regulating a model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 251-268.
    8. Ozan Candogan & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver," Papers 2101.10431, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    9. Cong, Lin William & Grenadier, Steven R. & Hu, Yunzhi, 2020. "Dynamic interventions and informational linkages," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 1-15.
    10. Ding, Haina & Guembel, Alexander & Ozanne, Alessio, 2020. "Market Information in Banking Supervision: The Role of Stress Test Design," TSE Working Papers 20-1144, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    11. Gu, Jiadong, 2023. "Optimal stress tests and liquidation cost," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    12. Fiordelisi, Franco & Ricci, Ornella & Santilli, Gianluca, 2025. "Spotlight on physical risk: Assessing the banks' stock reaction to the ECB climate stress test," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    13. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2019. "Censorship as Optimal Persuasion," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201903, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 05 Mar 2020.
    14. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2018. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," 2018 Meeting Papers 566, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Joel Shapiro & Jing Zeng, 2024. "Stress Testing and Bank Lending," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(4), pages 1265-1314.
    16. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    17. Agarwal, Isha & Goel, Tirupam, 2024. "Bank regulation and supervision: A symbiotic relationship," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    18. Chen, Yehning & Hasan, Iftekhar & Takalo, Tuomas, 2025. "Bank transparency, asset and liquidity risks," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/2025, Bank of Finland.
    19. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    20. Zanin, Luca & Calabrese, Raffaella & Thorburn, Connor Innes, 2024. "Climate stress testing for mortgage default probability," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 95(PB).
    21. Cuzzola, Angelo & Barbieri, Claudio & Hałaj, Grzegorz, 2025. "Gaming the test? Window-dressing and portfolio similarity around the EU-wide stress tests," Working Paper Series 3094, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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