IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed017/1340.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Unemployment Insurance Union

Author

Listed:
  • Marius Clemens

    (German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin))

  • Guillaume Claveres

    (Universite Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

A European unemployment insurance scheme has gained increased attention as a new and ambitious common fiscal instrument which could be used for temporary cross-country transfers. Part of the national stabilizers composing unemployment insurance schemes would be transferred to the central level. Unemployed are then insured by both layers. When a country is hit by an asymmetric shock, it would receive positive net transfers from the central fund in the form of reduced taxes and increased benefits, providing risk-sharing for the whole union. We build a two-country DSGE model with supply, demand and labor market shocks in order to capture the recent national insurance system and the unemployment insurance union (UIU) design. The model is calibrated to the euro area core and periphery data and matches the empirically observed cyclicality of the net replacement rate, the wage and unemployment dynamics. This baseline scenario is then compared to a optimal unemployment insurance union with passive and active benefit policies. For all underlying shocks, we find that the UIU reduces the fluctuation of consumption and unemployment while it increases the fluctuation of the trade balance. In case of a positive domestic government spending shock the UIU reduces the negative crowding out effect on private consumption and investment. The model will be used to analyze the effects of national and supranational benefit policies on labour market patterns and welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Marius Clemens & Guillaume Claveres, 2017. "Unemployment Insurance Union," 2017 Meeting Papers 1340, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed017:1340
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2017/paper_1340.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philip Jung & Keith Kuester, 2015. "Optimal Labor-Market Policy in Recessions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 124-156, April.
    2. Ljungqvist, Lars & Sargent, Thomas J., 2007. "Understanding European unemployment with a representative family model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2180-2204, November.
    3. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    4. Moyen, Stéphane & Stähler, Nikolai & Winkler, Fabian, 2016. "Optimal unemployment insurance and international risk sharing," Discussion Papers 33/2016, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    5. Philipp Engler & Simon Voigts, 2013. "A Transfer Mechanism for a Monetary Union," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-013, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    6. Fabio Ghironi & Marc J. Melitz, 2005. "International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with Heterogeneous Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(3), pages 865-915.
    7. Guler, Bulent & Taskin, Temel, 2013. "Does unemployment insurance crowd out home production?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-16.
    8. Robert C. M. Beyer & Frank Smets, 2015. "Editor'S Choice Labour market adjustments and migration in Europe and the United States: how different?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 30(84), pages 643-682.
    9. Kory Kroft & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2016. "Should Unemployment Insurance Vary with the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 1092-1124.
    10. Erceg, Christopher J. & Henderson, Dale W. & Levin, Andrew T., 2000. "Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage and price contracts," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 281-313, October.
    11. Merz, Monika, 1995. "Search in the labor market and the real business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 269-300, November.
    12. Shigeru Fujita & Garey Ramey, 2012. "Exogenous versus Endogenous Separation," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 68-93, October.
    13. Mathias Dolls & Clemens Fuest & Dirk Neumann & Andreas Peichl, 2016. "A Basic Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(1), pages 55-60, 05.
    14. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    15. Albertini, Julien & Fairise, Xavier, 2013. "Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 1796-1813.
    16. Paolo Pasimeni, 2014. "An Optimum Currency Crisis," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 11(2), pages 173-204, December.
    17. Julien Albertini & Arthur Poirier, 2015. "Unemployment Benefit Extension at the Zero Lower Bound," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 733-751, October.
    18. Mitman, Kurt & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2015. "Optimal unemployment insurance in an equilibrium business-cycle model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 99-118.
    19. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
    20. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    21. Moyen, Stéphane & Stähler, Nikolai, 2014. "Unemployment Insurance And The Business Cycle: Should Benefit Entitlement Duration React To The Cycle?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(03), pages 497-525, April.
    22. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-438, April.
    23. Andolfatto, David, 1996. "Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 112-132, March.
    24. repec:ces:ifodic:v:14:y:2016:i:1:p:19204335 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Ljungqvist, Lars & Sargent, Thomas J., 2007. "Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2139-2179, November.
    26. Sebastian Dullien & Ferdinand Fichtner, 2013. "A Common Unemployment Insurance System for the Euro Area," DIW Economic Bulletin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 3(1), pages 9-14.
    27. Evers, Michael P., 2012. "Federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 507-525.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed017:1340. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.