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Merger and Innovation Incentives in a Differentiated Industry

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  • Kesavayuth, Dusanee
  • Lee, Sang-Ho
  • Zikos, Vasileios

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a duopoly with product differentiation and examine the interaction between merger and innovation incentives. The analysis reveals that a merger tends to discourage innovation, unless the investment cost is sufficiently low. This result holds whether or not side payments between firms are allowed. When side payments are permitted, a bilateral merger-to-monopoly is always profitable, a standard result in the literature. When side payments are not permitted, however, we show that a merger is not profitable when the efficiency of the new technology is relatively high and the investment cost is below a particular level.

Suggested Citation

  • Kesavayuth, Dusanee & Lee, Sang-Ho & Zikos, Vasileios, 2017. "Merger and Innovation Incentives in a Differentiated Industry," MPRA Paper 79821, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:79821
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lee, Sang-Ho & Muminov, Timur K. & Tomaru, Yoshihiro, 2017. "Partial Privatization And Subsidization In A Mixed Duopoly: R&D Versus Output Subsidies," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 58(2), pages 163-177, December.
    2. Lee, Sang-Ho & Muminov, Timur, 2017. "R&D Output Sharing in a Mixed Duopoly and Incentive Subsidy Policy," MPRA Paper 81732, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Merger; R&D; innovation; differentiated products;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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