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The influence of relational experience and contractual governance on the negotiation strategy in buyer-supplier disputes

Author

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  • Lumineau, Fabrice
  • Henderson, James

Abstract

This paper theoretically refines and empirically extends the debate on the type of interplay between relational experience and contractual governance in an under-researched area: supply chain disputes. We define relational experience as either cooperative or competitive; distinguish between control and coordination functions of contractual governance; and assess their interplay on the negotiation strategy used in disputes. Using a unique data set of buyer-supplier disputes, we find, in particular, that increasing contractual control governance weakens the positive effect of cooperative relational experience on cooperative negotiation strategy. However, increasing contractual control governance for a buyer-supplier dyad with competitive relational experience will increase cooperative negotiation strategy. Contractual coordination governance reinforces the positive effect of cooperative relational experience. Through this study, we reach a better understanding of how and when contractual and relational governance dimensions interact; rather than whether they act as substitutes or complements as has been studied in prior research. We discuss the implications of these findings for the field of supply chain management.

Suggested Citation

  • Lumineau, Fabrice & Henderson, James, 2012. "The influence of relational experience and contractual governance on the negotiation strategy in buyer-supplier disputes," MPRA Paper 38510, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38510
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38510/1/MPRA_paper_38510.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rota, Cosimo & Zanasi, Cesare & Reynolds, Nikolai, 2014. "Assessing the Impact of Sustainability Improvement Options on the Agri-food Supply Chain Governance Structures: Development of an Evaluation Tool," International Journal on Food System Dynamics, International Center for Management, Communication, and Research, vol. 5(3).
    2. Ricarda B. Bouncken & Boris D. Plüschke & Robin Pesch & Sascha Kraus, 2016. "Entrepreneurial orientation in vertical alliances: joint product innovation and learning from allies," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 381-409, March.
    3. repec:eee:respol:v:47:y:2018:i:6:p:1096-1110 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Son, Byung-Gak & Kocabasoglu-Hillmer, Canan & Roden, Sinéad, 2016. "A dyadic perspective on retailer–supplier relationships through the lens of social capital," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 120-131.
    5. Luo, Yadong & Liu, Yi & Yang, Qian & Maksimov, Vladislav & Hou, Jigang, 2015. "Improving performance and reducing cost in buyer–supplier relationships: The role of justice in curtailing opportunism," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 607-615.
    6. Ricarda Bouncken & Boris Plüschke & Robin Pesch & Sascha Kraus, 2016. "Entrepreneurial orientation in vertical alliances: joint product innovation and learning from allies," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 381-409, March.
    7. Sean M. Handley & Corey M. Angst, 2015. "The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(9), pages 1412-1434, September.
    8. Rota, Cosimo & Zanasi, Cesare & Reynolds, Nikolai, 2014. "Assessing the Supply Chain Governance Scenario in the Agri-food Sector: Development of a Measurement Tool," 2014 International European Forum, February 17-21, 2014, Innsbruck-Igls, Austria 199341, International European Forum on Innovation and System Dynamics in Food Networks.
    9. repec:bla:jscmgt:v:53:y:2017:i:4:p:37-66 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Buyer-supplier relationships; contractual governance; relational experience; supply chain governance; negotiation; dispute;

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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