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Government interventions in banking crises: Assessing alternative schemes in a banking model of debt overhang

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  • Dietrich, Diemo
  • Hauck, Achim

Abstract

We evaluate policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalize risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance granted without reference to new activities, like establishing a bad bank, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Dietrich, Diemo & Hauck, Achim, 2010. "Government interventions in banking crises: Assessing alternative schemes in a banking model of debt overhang," MPRA Paper 24508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24508
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    Cited by:

    1. John Nkwoma Inekwe, 2019. "The exploration of economic crises: parameter uncertainty and predictive ability," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(2), pages 290-313, May.
    2. Dietrich, Diemo & Vollmer, Uwe, 2012. "Are universal banks bad for financial stability? Germany during the world financial crisis," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 123-134.
    3. Monika Bucher & Diemo Dietrich & Achim Hauck, 2019. "Implications of bank regulation for loan supply and bank stability: a dynamic perspective," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(16), pages 1527-1550, November.
    4. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.
    5. Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2015. "Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: Comparing different bad bank schemes," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 116-128.
    6. Alin-Marius ANDRIEȘ & Florentina IEȘAN-MUNTEAN & Simona NISTOR, 2016. "The effectiveness of policy interventions in CEE countries," Eastern Journal of European Studies, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 7, pages 93-124, June.
    7. Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, 2012. "Deutsche Konjunktur im Aufwind – Europäische Schuldenkrise schwelt weiter," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(08), pages 03-72, April.
    8. Michael Diemer & Uwe Vollmer, 2015. "What makes banking crisis resolution difficult? Lessons from Japan and the Nordic Countries," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(2), pages 251-277, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking crisis; debt overhang; bank lending; capital structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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