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Corporate Governance, Competetion, The new International Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets

  • Singh, Ajit
  • Singh, Alaka
  • Weisse, Bruce

This paper examines from the developing countries perspective important analytical and policy issues arising from: a) the current international discussions about corporate governance in relation to the New International Financial Architecture; b) changes in the international competitive environment being caused by the enormous international merger movement in advanced countries. The background to a) above is the emergence of corporate governance as a key issue in the current G7 proposals for the New International Financial Architecture. The G7 emphasis on corporate governance can be traced back to the thesis that the ‘deeper’ reasons for the Asian crisis lay in the microeconomic behaviour of corporations and businesses in the affected countries. The failings of the corporate governance mechanisms and distortions in the competitive process have received special scrutiny in such analyses. With respect to b) above, the context is that the largest corporations in advanced countries are currently in the process of potentially cartelising the world market place through a spate of cross-border mergers and take-overs. This huge merger movement raises serious policy concerns for developing countries. The paper's main conclusions are: 1. The thesis that the deeper causes of the Asian crisis were the flawed systems of corporate governance and a poor competitive environment in the affected countries is not supported by evidence. 2. The Anglo-Saxon model of widely held corporations with dispersed share ownership is by far the exception in developing countries and in much of continental Europe. Empirical evidence suggests that emerging markets, as well as European countries such as Italy, Sweden or Germany have successful records of fast long-term growth with different governance systems, indeed superior to those of Anglo-Saxon countries. 3. Empirical evidence does not support the view that the Asian crisis 1997 to 1999 was caused by crony capitalism. 4. Corporate financing patterns in emerging markets in the 1990s were broadly similar to those observed in the 1980s. Unlike their counterparts in advanced countries, large developing countries firms continued to rely overwhelmingly on external sources to finance their growth of total assets. 5. The analysis of this paper does not support the claim that developing country conglomerates are inefficient, financially precarious and necessarily create moral hazard. It also indicates that contrary to widely held beliefs, product market competition in emerging countries is no less intense than in advanced economies. Acknowledgements Please do not quote without permission from the authors. Comments are most welcome.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24305.

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Date of creation: Dec 2002
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24305
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  1. Khanna, Tarun, 2000. "Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing evidence and unanswered questions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 748-761, May.
  2. Glen, Jack & Lee, Kevin & Singh, Ajit, 2000. "Competition, corporate governance and financing of corporate growth in emerging markets," MPRA Paper 53625, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Waring, Geoffrey F, 1996. "Industry Differences in the Persistence of Firm-Specific Returns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1253-65, December.
  4. Geroski, Paul A & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "The Persistence of Profits: A European Comparison," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 375-89, June.
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  7. Singh, Ajit & Singh, Alaka & Wiesse, Bruce, 2000. "Information technology, venture capital and the stock market," MPRA Paper 53718, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. James Tybout, 1998. "Manufacturing Firms In Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, And Why?," Development and Comp Systems 9805004, EconWPA.
  9. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Erik BERGLÖF & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1999. "The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm : Implications for Transition and Developing Countries," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9912, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  11. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351.
  12. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
  13. Eric Friedman & Simon Johnson & Peter Boone & Alasdair Breach, 1999. "Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis," Departmental Working Papers 199920, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  14. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521781640 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Singh, A., 1995. "Corporate Financial Patterns in Industrializing Economies. A Coparative International Study," Papers 2, World Bank - International Finance Corporation.
  16. Singh, Ajit, 1998. "The Asian Model: A Crisis Foretold?," MPRA Paper 24683, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Singh, Ajit, 1998. "Financial crisis in East Asia: "The end of the Asian model"?," MPRA Paper 53539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Singh, Ajit, 1997. "Savings, investment and the corporation in the East Asian miracle," MPRA Paper 53884, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521053617 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110.
  21. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  22. Singh, Ajit, 1996. "Financial liberalisation,stockmarkets and economic development," MPRA Paper 53897, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Singh, Ajit & Zammit, Ann, 2000. "International Capital Flows: Identifying the Gender Dimension," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(7), pages 1249-1268, July.
  24. Whittington, G & Saporta, V & Singh, A, 1997. "The Effects of Hyper-Inflation on Accounting Ratios. Financing Corporate Growth in Industrial Economies," Papers 3, World Bank - International Finance Corporation.
  25. Singh, A. & Hamid, J., 1992. "Corporate Financial Structure in Developing Countries," Papers 1, World Bank - International Finance Corporation.
  26. Sidney G. Winter, 1964. "Economic "Natural Selection" and the Theory of the Firm," LEM Chapters Series, in: Yale Economic Essays, pages 225-272 Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  27. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
  28. Goddard, J. A. & Wilson, J. O. S., 1999. "The persistence of profit: a new empirical interpretation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 663-687, July.
  29. Leff, Nathaniel H, 1979. "Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: The Problem Revisited," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 46-64, March.
  30. Connolly, Robert A. & Schwartz, Steven, 1985. "The intertemporal behavior of economic profits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 379-400, December.
  31. Leff, Nathaniel H, 1978. "Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries: The Economic Groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(4), pages 661-75, July.
  32. Singh, A., 1997. "Liberalisation, the Stock Market and the Market for Corporate Control: A Bridge Too Far for the Indian Economy?," Accounting and Finance Discussion Papers 97-af35, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  33. Singh, Ajit & Weisse, Bruce A., 1998. "Emerging stock markets, portfolio capital flows and long-term economie growth: Micro and macroeconomic perspectives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 607-622, April.
  34. Jensen, Michael C, 1988. "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 21-48, Winter.
  35. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
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