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Corporate Governance, Competetion, The new International Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets

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  • Singh, Ajit
  • Singh, Alaka
  • Weisse, Bruce

Abstract

This paper examines from the developing countries perspective important analytical and policy issues arising from: a) the current international discussions about corporate governance in relation to the New International Financial Architecture; b) changes in the international competitive environment being caused by the enormous international merger movement in advanced countries. The background to a) above is the emergence of corporate governance as a key issue in the current G7 proposals for the New International Financial Architecture. The G7 emphasis on corporate governance can be traced back to the thesis that the ‘deeper’ reasons for the Asian crisis lay in the microeconomic behaviour of corporations and businesses in the affected countries. The failings of the corporate governance mechanisms and distortions in the competitive process have received special scrutiny in such analyses. With respect to b) above, the context is that the largest corporations in advanced countries are currently in the process of potentially cartelising the world market place through a spate of cross-border mergers and take-overs. This huge merger movement raises serious policy concerns for developing countries. The paper's main conclusions are: 1. The thesis that the deeper causes of the Asian crisis were the flawed systems of corporate governance and a poor competitive environment in the affected countries is not supported by evidence. 2. The Anglo-Saxon model of widely held corporations with dispersed share ownership is by far the exception in developing countries and in much of continental Europe. Empirical evidence suggests that emerging markets, as well as European countries such as Italy, Sweden or Germany have successful records of fast long-term growth with different governance systems, indeed superior to those of Anglo-Saxon countries. 3. Empirical evidence does not support the view that the Asian crisis 1997 to 1999 was caused by crony capitalism. 4. Corporate financing patterns in emerging markets in the 1990s were broadly similar to those observed in the 1980s. Unlike their counterparts in advanced countries, large developing countries firms continued to rely overwhelmingly on external sources to finance their growth of total assets. 5. The analysis of this paper does not support the claim that developing country conglomerates are inefficient, financially precarious and necessarily create moral hazard. It also indicates that contrary to widely held beliefs, product market competition in emerging countries is no less intense than in advanced economies. Acknowledgements Please do not quote without permission from the authors. Comments are most welcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Singh, Ajit & Singh, Alaka & Weisse, Bruce, 2002. "Corporate Governance, Competetion, The new International Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets," MPRA Paper 24305, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24305
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Deakin & Ajit Singh, 2009. "The Stock Market, the Market for Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for Public Policy," Chapters,in: The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment, chapter 9 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Ajit Singh & Ann Zammit, 2006. "Corporate Governance, Crony Capitalism and Economic Crises: should the US business model replace the Asian way of "doing business"?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 220-233, July.
    3. Reaz, Mazrur & Arun, Thankom G., 2005. "Corporate Governance in Developing Economies: Perspective from the Banking Sector in Bangladesh," Development Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 30545, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    4. Ajit Singh, 2003. "Corporate governance, corporate finance and stock markets in emerging countries," Working Papers wp258, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    5. John Armour & Simon Deakin & Prabirjit Sarkar & Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh, 2007. "Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis," Working Papers wp358, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    6. Charles Amo Yartey, 2009. "The Stock Market and the Financing of Corporate Growth in Africa: The Case of Ghana," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(4), pages 53-68, July.
    7. Christoph Walkner, 2004. "Issues in corporate governance," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 200, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    8. Michael Graff, 2013. "Legal origin and financial development: new evidence for old claims? The creditor rights index revisited," International Journal of Trade and Global Markets, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(4), pages 326-344.
    9. Ajit Singh, 2003. "Competition, corporate governance and selection in emerging markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages 443-464, November.
    10. Michael Graff, 2005. "Law and Finance: Common-law and Civil-law Countries Compared," KOF Working papers 05-99, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    11. Michael Graff, 2006. "Myths and Truths: The "Law and Finance Theory" Revisited," KOF Working papers 06-122, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    12. Singh, Ajit, 2003. "Corporate governance, the big business groups and the G-7 reform agenda: A critical analysis," MPRA Paper 24663, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Charles Amo Yartey, 2009. "The Stock Market and the Financing of Corporate Growth in Africa: The Case of Ghana," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(4), pages 53-68, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition; Corporate Governance; Emerging Markets;

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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