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The Stock Market, the Market for Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for Public Policy

  • Simon deakin
  • Ajit Singh

It is argued here that - contrary to current conventional wisdom - an active market for corporate control is not an essential ingredient of either company law reform or financial and economic development. The absence of such a market in coordinated market systems during their modern economic development was not an evolutionary deficit, but an effective and positive institutional arrangement. The economic and social costs associated with restructuring driven by hostile takeover bids, which are increasingly seen as prohibitive in the liberal market economies, would most likely harm the prospects for growth in developing and transition systems.

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Paper provided by ESRC Centre for Business Research in its series ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers with number wp365.

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Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp365
Note: PRO-2
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/

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  1. Ajit Singh, 1999. "Should Africa promote stock market capitalism?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(3), pages 343-365.
  2. David Alexander Clark (ed.), 2006. "The Elgar Companion to Development Studies," Books, Edward Elgar, number 3175, Autumn.
  3. Dale W. Jorgenson, 2001. "Information Technology and the U. S. Economy," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1911, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Black, Bernard S. & Gilson, Ronald J., 1998. "Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 243-277, March.
  5. Gunther Tichy, 2001. "What Do We Know about Success and Failure of Mergers?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 347-394, December.
  6. Singh, Ajit & Singh, Alaka & Weisse, Bruce, 2002. "Corporate governance, competition, the new international financial architecture and large corporations in emerging markets," MPRA Paper 53665, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Singh, A., 1997. "Liberalisation, the Stock Market and the Market for Corporate Control: A Bridge Too Far for the Indian Economy?," Accounting and Finance Discussion Papers 97-af35, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  8. Yarrow, George K, 1985. "Shareholder Protection, Compulsory Acquisition and the Efficiency of the Takeover Process," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 3-16, September.
  9. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 2000. "The End Of History For Corporate Law," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm136, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2001.
  10. Antoine Rebérioux, 2007. "Does shareholder primacy lead to a decline in managerial accountability?," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 507-524, July.
  11. Ajit Singh, 2008. "Stock Markets in Low and Middle Income Countries," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp377, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  12. Dale W. Jorgenson, 2001. "Information Technology and the U.S. Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 1-32, March.
  13. John Buchanan & Simon Deakin, 2007. "Japan's Paradoxical Response to the new 'Global Standard' in Corporate Governance," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp351, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  14. Simon Deakin, 2007. "Reflexive Governance and European Company Law," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp346, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  15. Singh, A., 1991. "Corporate Takeovers: A Review," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9206, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  16. Mathias Siems, 2007. "Shareholder Protection around the World ("Leximetric II")," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp359, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  17. John Parkinson, 2003. "Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 41(3), pages 481-509, 09.
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