Governance, Regulation and Financial Market Instability: The Implciations for Policy
Just as the 1929 Stock Market Crash discredited Classical economic theory and policy and opened the way for Keynesianism, a consequence of the collapse of confidence in financial markets and the banking system – and the effect that this has had on the global macro economy – is currently discrediting the ‘conventional wisdom’ of neo-liberalism. This paper argues that at the heart of the crisis is a breakdown in governance that has its roots in the co-evolution of political and economic developments and of economic theory and policy since the 1929 Stock Market Crash and the Great Depression that followed. However, while many are looking back to the Great Depression and to the theories and policies that seemed to contribute to recovery during the first part of the twentieth century, we argue that the current context is different from the earlier one; and there are more recent events that may provide better insight into the causes and contributing factors giving rise to the present crisis and to the implications for theory and policy that follow.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hyman P. Minsky, 1992. "The Financial Instability Hypothesis," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_74, Levy Economics Institute.
- Yago, Glenn, 1991. "Junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate America," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195061116, March.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s," NBER Working Papers 8220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Smith, Adam, 1776. "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number smith1776.
- Oliver E. Williamson, 2002. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 171-195, Summer.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp392. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.