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Issues in corporate governance

Author

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  • Christoph Walkner

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to review issues and problems arising in the area of corporate governance from a broader economic perspective at a time when a series of major corporate accounting fraud scandals has renewed interest in the subject. The paper highlights the economic significance of corporate governance forresource allocation, investment decisions, and financial market development.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Walkner, 2004. "Issues in corporate governance," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 200, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  • Handle: RePEc:euf:ecopap:0200
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    File URL: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication750_en.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Constantinos Chalevas & Christos Tzovas, 2010. "The effect of the mandatory adoption of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings manipulation, management effectiveness and firm financing: Evidence from Greece," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 257-277, February.
    2. Chalevas, Constantinos G., 2011. "The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 138-174, June.
    3. Joanna Kuczewska & Joanna Stefaniak-Kopoboru, 2015. "Challenges for the EU Industrial Policy," Working Papers of Economics of European Integration Division 1501, The Univeristy of Gdansk, Faculty of Economics, Economics of European Integration Division.

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