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Issues in corporate governance

  • Christoph Walkner
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    The objective of this paper is to review issues and problems arising in the area of corporate governance from a broader economic perspective at a time when a series of major corporate accounting fraud scandals has renewed interest in the subject. The paper highlights the economic significance of corporate governance forresource allocation, investment decisions, and financial market development.

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    File URL: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication750_en.pdf
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    Paper provided by Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission in its series European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 with number 200.

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    Length: 43 pages
    Date of creation: Mar 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:euf:ecopap:0200
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Inter-institutional relations and communication Unit, B-1049 Brussels

    Fax: +32 2 298.08.23
    Web page: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/index_en.htm
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    1. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
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    4. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.
    5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1882, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    6. Klaus Gugler & Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, 2001. "Corporate Governance, Capital MarketDiscipline and the Returns on Investment," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-25, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    7. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2003. "Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," NBER Working Papers 9643, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Singh, Ajit & Singh, Alaka & Weisse, Bruce, 2002. "Corporate Governance, Competetion, The new International Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets," MPRA Paper 24305, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Negative Alchemy?: Corruption and Composition of Capital Flows," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 165, OECD Publishing.
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    12. Bernard Yeung & Kathy S. He & Randall Morck, 2004. "Corporate Stability and Economic Growth," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 84, Econometric Society.
    13. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109 Elsevier.
    14. Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "How corporate governance and globalization can run afoul of the law and good practices in business: The Enron's disgraceful affair," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 225, Universidad del CEMA.
    15. Nenova, Tatiana, 2003. "The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 325-351, June.
    16. William R. Emmons & Frank A. Schmid, 2001. "Corporate governance, entrenched labor, and economic growth," Working Papers 2001-023, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    17. International Monetary Fund, 2000. "Institutions Matter in Transition, But so do Policies," IMF Working Papers 00/70, International Monetary Fund.
    18. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Schleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2001. "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance," Working Paper Series rwp01-017, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    19. Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 6309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. James T. Moser & Subu Venkataraman, 1996. "The economics of disclosure requirements for derivatives," Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Oct.
    21. Shang-Jin Wei & R. Gelos, 2002. "Transparency and International Investor Behavior," IMF Working Papers 02/174, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Peter Murrell, 1995. "The Transition According to Cambridge, Mass," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 164-178, March.
    23. William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, 2001. "Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings," NBER Working Papers 8164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Denis, Cecile & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Are Foreign Ownership and Good Institutions Substitutes? The Case of Non-Traded Equity," CEPR Discussion Papers 4339, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    25. Pietro Garibaldi & Nada Mora & Ratna Sahay & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "What Moves Capital to Transition Economies?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 6.
    26. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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