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Corporate Governance, Capital MarketDiscipline and the Returns on Investment

  • Klaus Gugler
  • Dennis C. Mueller
  • B. Burcin Yurtoglu

We analyze the impact of corporate governance institutions, ownership structures andexternal capital market constraints on company returns on investment by using a sampleof more than 19,000 companies from 61 countries across the world. We show that (1) ofthese three sets of institutions, the origin of a country’s legal system proves to be themost important. Companies in countries with English-origin legal systems earn returnson investment that are at least as large as the cost of capital. (2) Differences ininvestment performance related to a country’s legal system dominate differences relatedto ownership structure. (3) Strong external capital markets improve the investmentperformance of companies. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Corporate Governance, Kapitalmarktdisziplinierung und die Renditen vonUnternehmensinvestitionen) Dieses Papier analysiert den Einfluss von Corporate Governance Institutionen, Eigentümerstrukturen und externen Kapitalmärkten auf die Renditen von Investitionen für ein Sample von mehr als 19.000 Unternehmen aus 61 Ländern weltweit. Wir zeigen, dass von diesen drei Institutionen (1) die Herkunft des Rechtssystems eines Landes der wichtigste Faktor ist. Unternehmen in Ländern mit Rechtssystemen englischer Herkunft verdienen Renditen, die die Kapitalkosten im Durchschnitt abdecken. (2) Unterschiede im Rechtssystem eines Landes dominieren Unterschiede in der Eigentümerstruktur. (3) Funktionierende externe Kapitalmärkte verbessern die Performance von Investitionen.

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Paper provided by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) in its series CIG Working Papers with number FS IV 01-25.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published under the title "Corporate Governance and the Returns on Investment" in the Journal of Law and Economics , Vol. 47, 2004, pp. 589-633.
Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv01-25
Contact details of provider: Postal: Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany
Phone: (++49)(30) 25491-441
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Web page: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/wiw/default.en.htm
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