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Corporate Governance and Investments in Scandinavia - ownership concentration and dual-class equity structure

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  • Eklund, Johan E.

    (JIBS and CESIS)

Abstract

Juridical-political theories suggest that legal origin (La Porta et al. (1997)) and political factors (Roe (2003)) matters for firm performance. In Scandinavia there are a number of legal practices, with common political roots, that impinge on the distribution of corporate control, which accordingly may affect firm performance. This paper examines the return on investments and the effects of ownership concentration in a large sample of listed Scandinavian firms. As a performance measure marginal q developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993) is used. Marginal q measures the marginal return on capital relative its cost of capital. This is a more appropriate measure of performance than Tobin’s average q. The question of how ownership concentration affects managerial investment decisions is examined. A Scandinavian corporate governance feature is the wide spread use of vote-differentiation. How deviations from the one-share-one-vote principle affects this ownership-performance relationship is analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Eklund, Johan E., 2007. "Corporate Governance and Investments in Scandinavia - ownership concentration and dual-class equity structure," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 98, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0098
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Eklund, Johan & Desai, Sameeksha, 2008. "Ownership, Economic Entrenchment and Allocation of Capital," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 123, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investments; Marginal q; Corporate Governance; Ownership Concentration; Dual-Class Shares;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

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