Ownership Structure, Control and Firm Performance: The Effects of Vote Differentiated Shares
This paper contributes to the literature on ownership, control and performance by exploring these relationships for Swedish listed companies (1997-2002). We find that firms, on average, are making inferior investment decisions and that the use of dual-class shares have a negative effect on performance. According to our results concentration of ownership has a negative impact on investment performance and firm value when control instruments that separate votes from capital share are used. Marginal q is used as a measure of economic performance. It was presented in an article by Mueller and Reardon in 1993 and has recently been used in empirical studies of ownership and performance by among others Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003). Frequently Tobin’s q is used in studies of this type, but Tobin’s q has a number of disadvantages which can be circumvented by employing a marginal q. This study adds to earlier studies by investigating how the separation of vote and capital shares’ creates a wedge between the incentives and the ability to pursue value maximization. The relationships between the performance measure and different ownership characteristics like ownership concentration and foreign ownership are also investigated.
|Date of creation:||27 Oct 2005|
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- Klaus Gugler & Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, 2001. "Corporate Governance, Capital MarketDiscipline and the Returns on Investment," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-25, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Gugler, Klaus & Yurtoglu, Burcin B., 2003. "Average q, marginal q, and the relation between ownership and performance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 379-384, March.
- Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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