Industry Specific Effects in Investment Performance and Valuation of Firms - Marginal q in a Stock Market Bubble
A necessary criterion for a performance measure in corporate governance is the degree to which it mirrors how well the management succeeds in maximizing firm value. Such a performance measure is marginal q which links changes in firm value to the investments decided by the management. Empirical studies of investment and performance based on marginal q have demonstrated the usefulness of this measure. Most research however, has mainly focused on long-term performance. This paper takes a short-term perspective and, based on the marginal q-theory, considers how market values change in the extreme stock price cycle of a stock market bubble. We find an anomaly in form of a new industry specific effect that, in addition to investment, explains changes in firm value.
|Date of creation:||28 Dec 2005|
|Date of revision:|
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