IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Democracy and growth: is the effect non-linear?

  • Libman, Alexander
Registered author(s):

    The paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical literature on non-linear impact of democracy on economic growth. First, it looks at two main approaches to the non-linearity: the U-shape and the inverse U-shape. Then it proceeds by looking at the specifics of hybrid regimes and tries to understand, whether the results could be driven by specific features of some semi-democracies and semi-autocracies. Finally, it discusses the opportunity to test the growth-and-democracy nexus using subnational data, and considers the first results of this approach.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17795/1/MPRA_paper_17795.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17795.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: Sep 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17795
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
    Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
    Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
    Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2004. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," CEPR Discussion Papers 4777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Jenny A. Minier, 2001. "Is Democracy a Normal Good? Evidence from Democratic Movements," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 996-1009, April.
    3. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, 2004. "Interest Groups, Veto Points And Electricity Infrastructure Deployment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-711, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2001. "Democracy, Rent Seeking, Public Spending And Growth," Bulletins 12981, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    5. Muhammed N. Islam & Stanley L. Winer, 2004. "Tinpots, Totalitarians (and Democrats): An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Economic Growth on Civil Liberties and Political Rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 289-323, 03.
    6. Timothy Besley & Masayuki Kudamatsu, 2007. "Making Autocracy Work," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 48, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    7. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, 2001. "The Institutional Environment for Telecommunications Investment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 123-147, 03.
    8. Leone Leonida & Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Pietro Navarra, 2007. "Towards an equilibrium level of market reform: how politics affects the dynamics of policy change," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(13), pages 1627-1634.
    9. Witold J. Henisz & Edward D. Mansfield, 2004. "Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-712, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    10. Page, Scott E., 2006. "Path Dependence," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 87-115, January.
    11. Barro, Robert J, 1996. " Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, March.
    12. Roubini, Nouriel & Swagel, Phillip & Ozler, Sule & Alesina, Alberto, 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Scholarly Articles 4553024, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    13. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2006. "Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details," CEPR Discussion Papers 5499, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Peter Scott, 2006. "Path dependence, fragmented property rights and the slow diffusion of high throughput technologies in inter-war British coal mining," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(1), pages 20-42.
    15. Khurram Jamali & Kirsten Wandschneider & Phanindra Wunnava, 2007. "The effect of political regimes and technology on economic growth," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(11), pages 1425-1432.
    16. Huynh, Kim P. & Jacho-Chávez, David T., 2009. "Growth and governance: A nonparametric analysis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 121-143, March.
    17. Jakob Haan, 2007. "Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 281-292, June.
    18. Ludovic Comeau, 2003. "Democracy and Growth: A Relationship Revisited," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, Winter.
    19. Henderson, Daniel J. & Papageorgiou, Chris & Parmeter, Christopher F., 2008. "Are any growth theories linear? Why we should care about what the evidence tells us," MPRA Paper 8767, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Amable, Bruno, 2003. "The Diversity of Modern Capitalism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199261147, March.
    21. Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," NBER Working Papers 9608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Polterovich, Victor & Popov, Vladimir, 2007. "Democratization, Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 19152, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 1321-1352, December.
    24. Janine Aron, 1997. "Political, economic and social institutions: a review of growth evidence," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/1998-04, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    25. Axel Dreher & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Friedrich Schneider, 2014. "The devil is in the shadow: Do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/132819, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    26. Fidrmuc, Jan, 2001. "Democracy in transition economies: Grease or sand in the wheels of growth?," ZEI Working Papers B 09-2001, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
    27. Michael T. Rock, 2007. "Corruption and Democracy," Working Papers 55, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    28. Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
    29. Alesina, Alberto, et al, 1996. " Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
    30. Raj M. Desai & Anders Olofsg�Rd & Tarik M. Yousef, 2009. "The Logic Of Authoritarian Bargains," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 93-125, 03.
    31. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson & Daniel M. Sturm, 2010. "Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States," CEP Discussion Papers dp1009, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    32. Kjell Hausken & Christian W. Martin & Thomas Plümper, 2004. "Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 239-259, 09.
    33. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, 03.
    34. Dick, G William, 1974. "Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 817-27, July/Aug..
    35. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 162-192, 04/05.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17795. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.