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Democracy and growth: is the effect non-linear?

  • Libman, Alexander
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    The paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical literature on non-linear impact of democracy on economic growth. First, it looks at two main approaches to the non-linearity: the U-shape and the inverse U-shape. Then it proceeds by looking at the specifics of hybrid regimes and tries to understand, whether the results could be driven by specific features of some semi-democracies and semi-autocracies. Finally, it discusses the opportunity to test the growth-and-democracy nexus using subnational data, and considers the first results of this approach.

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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17795/1/MPRA_paper_17795.pdf
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    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17795.

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    Date of creation: Sep 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17795
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    28. Henderson, Daniel J. & Papageorgiou, Chris & Parmeter, Christopher F., 2008. "Are any growth theories linear? Why we should care about what the evidence tells us," MPRA Paper 8767, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    29. Page, Scott E., 2006. "Path Dependence," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 87-115, January.
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