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Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions

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  • Alexander Libman

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Abstract

This article considers the impact of sub-national political systems on economic growth by applying the case of Russian regions from 2000 to 2004. It investigates two dimensions of the sub-national systems. First, it studies the influence of democracy on economic performance, providing evidence of a non-linear relationship between democracy and economic growth. Regions with high levels of democracy, as well as strong autocracies, perform better than hybrid regimes. Second, this article considers the influence of the size of the bureaucracy on economic outcomes and confirms the “grabbing hand” view on bureaucracy rather than the Weberian idea. Increasing the size of the bureaucracy is associated with a decline in economic performance. In addition, this article analyzes the potential interaction between these two characteristics of sub-national politics as factors of economic growth, but does not establish any robust results. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Libman, 2012. "Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 1321-1352, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:43:y:2012:i:3:p:1321-1352 DOI: 10.1007/s00181-011-0525-5
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Salahodjaev, Raufhon, 2015. "Democracy and economic growth: the role of intelligence in cross-country regressions," MPRA Paper 65716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Apr 2015.
    2. Hagemann, Harald & Kufenko, Vadim, 2014. "The political Kuznets curve for Russia: Income inequality, rent seeking regional elites and empirical determinants of protests during 2011/2012," Violette Reihe: Schriftenreihe des Promotionsschwerpunkts "Globalisierung und Beschäftigung" 39/2013, University of Hohenheim, Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg, Evangelisches Studienwerk.
    3. Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 82-99.
    4. Sergei Guriev & Elena Vakulenko, 2012. "Convergence between Russian regions," Working Papers w0180, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    5. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Democracy and growth: is the effect non-linear?," MPRA Paper 17795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Libman, Alexander & Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten & Yadav, Gaurav, 2013. "Are human rights and economic well-being substitutes? The evidence from migration patterns across the Indian states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 139-164.
    7. E. Tsanana & X. Chapsa & C. Katrakilidis, 2016. "Is growth corrupted or bureaucratic? Panel evidence from the enlarged EU," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(33), pages 3131-3147, July.
    8. repec:eee:rujoec:v:1:y:2015:i:1:p:30-54 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Bureaucracy; Sub-national political systems; Economic growth; Russian regions; D72; D73; O18; O43; P26;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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