Why Join the Party in a One-Party System?: Popularity versus Political Exchange
This paper investigates empirically the determinants of political stability in one-party states, taking as an example socialist Yugoslavia. The authors assume that the number of the party members is an indicator of the stability of the regime and perform a time series analysis for the six Yugoslav republics in the 1953-88 period. They find that rents distributed to the population were far more important than the popularity of economic policies and perhaps even more important than repression. These findings provide strong empirical support for economic models of dictatorship based on the notion of political exchange. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Volume (Year): 94 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
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