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Why Join the Party in a One-Party System?: Popularity versus Political Exchange

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  • Schnytzer, Adi
  • Sustersic, Janez

Abstract

This paper investigates empirically the determinants of political stability in one-party states, taking as an example socialist Yugoslavia. The authors assume that the number of the party members is an indicator of the stability of the regime and perform a time series analysis for the six Yugoslav republics in the 1953-88 period. They find that rents distributed to the population were far more important than the popularity of economic policies and perhaps even more important than repression. These findings provide strong empirical support for economic models of dictatorship based on the notion of political exchange. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Schnytzer, Adi & Sustersic, Janez, 1998. "Why Join the Party in a One-Party System?: Popularity versus Political Exchange," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 117-134, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:1-2:p:117-34
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    1. Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1994. "The political economy of stabilization programmes in developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 169-190, May.
    2. Hillman, Arye L. & Schnytzer, Adi, 1986. "Illegal economic activities and purges in a Soviet-type economy: A rent-seeking perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 87-99, June.
    3. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-245, June.
    4. Wiatr, Jerzy J., 1970. "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 1239-1245, December.
    5. Wintrobe, Ronald, 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 849-872, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lazarev, Valery, 2007. "Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 546-563, September.
    2. Kenneth Koford, 2000. "Citizen Restraints on “Leviathan” Government: Transition Politics in Bulgaria," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 3, pages 30-62.
    3. Siqueira, Kevin, 2003. "Participation in organized and unorganized protests and rebellions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 861-874, November.
    4. Lazarev, Valery, 2004. "Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime," Center Discussion Papers 28381, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    5. Eugenia Belova & Valery Lazarev, 2007. "Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 437-456, March.
    6. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Essays on Asymmetric Federalism," MPRA Paper 21591, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Michael Hoffman, 2005. "Discretion, Lobbying, and Political Influence in Models of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 175-188.
    8. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 1321-1352, December.
    9. Koford, Kenneth, 2000. "Citizen restraints on "Leviathan" government: transition politics in Bulgaria," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 307-338, June.

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