Why Join the Party in a One-Party System?: Popularity versus Political Exchange
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- Adi Schnytzer & Janez Šušteršič, 1998. "Why join the party in a one-party system?: Popularity versus political exchange," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 117-134, January.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Alexander Libman, 2012. "Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 1321-1352, December.
- Koford, Kenneth, 2000. "Citizen restraints on "Leviathan" government: transition politics in Bulgaria," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 307-338, June.
- Lazarev, Valery, 2007.
"Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 546-563, September.
- Lazarev, Valery, 2007. "Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime," MPRA Paper 2352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kenneth Koford, 2000. "Citizen Restraints on “Leviathan” Government: Transition Politics in Bulgaria," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 3, pages 30-62.
- Siqueira, Kevin, 2003. "Participation in organized and unorganized protests and rebellions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 861-874, November.
- Lazarev, Valery, 2004.
"Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime,"
Center Discussion Papers
28381, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
- Valery Lazarev, 2004. "Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime," Working Papers 882, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Eugenia Belova & Valery Lazarev, 2007. "Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 437-456, March.
- Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Essays on Asymmetric Federalism," MPRA Paper 21591, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Michael Hoffman, 2005. "Discretion, Lobbying, and Political Influence in Models of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 175-188.
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