The Probability of Military Rule in Africa, 1970-2007
In this paper we empirically analyze the socio-economic determinants of the existence of military dictatorships in Africa. A recent literature in political economy analyses the relationship between the civil undemocratic government and the military as an agency problem: the civilian government needs the army to avoid internal violence, but a larger army reduces the opportunity-cost for the military to run a coup d’état and seize power. These papers derive three main causes of military rule: income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and external threat. We empirically analyze these issues by estimating the probability that a country experiences a military rule. We consider 48 African countries over the period 1970-2007.
|Date of creation:||May 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.dse.univr.it
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521855266 is not listed on IDEAS
- Roberto Ricciuti & Jacopo Costa, 2010.
"State capacity, manufacturing and civil conflict,"
AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 3038-3043.
- Christa N. Brunnschweiler & Erwin Bulte, 2008.
"Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence and the Onset of Civil Wars,"
CER-ETH Economics working paper series
08/78, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Christa N. Brunnschweiler & Erwin H. Bulte, 2009. "Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 651-674, October.
- Christa N Brunnschweiler & Erwin H Bulte, 2009. "Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource abundance, dependence and the onset of civil wars," OxCarre Working Papers 018, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
- Faten Ghosn & Glenn Palmer & Stuart A. Bremer, 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993â€”2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(2), pages 133-154, April.
- Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2007. "Effective property rights, conflict and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 127-139, November.
- Timothy Besley & James A. Robinson, 2010. "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian Control Over the Military," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 655-663, 04-05.
- Olaf J. de Groot, 2011. "Spillovers of Institutional Change in Africa," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 410-426, 08.
- Caruso, Raul & Schneider, Friedrich, 2011. "The socio-economic determinants of terrorism and political violence in Western Europe (1994–2007)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(S1), pages S37-S49.
- Timothy J. Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009.
"State Capacity, Conflict and Development,"
NBER Working Papers
15088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "State Capacity, Conflict and Development," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 010, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2010. "State Capacity, Conflict and Development," Working Papers id:2665, eSocialSciences.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "State capacity, conflict and development," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25426, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Persson, Torsten, 2009. "State Capacity, Conflict and Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Raul Caruso, 2010. "Butter, Guns And Ice-Cream Theory And Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 269-283.
- Jose Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2010. "Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 123-143, April.
- Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
- Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, 2006.
"A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 571-585, December.
- Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, 2005. "A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states," Working Paper Series 5805, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Raul Caruso, 2004. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?," Others 0406003, EconWPA, revised 15 Dec 2004.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2008. "Wars and State Capacity," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 522-530, 04-05.
- Paul Collier & Frederick van der Ploeg & Michael Spence & Anthony J Venables, 2009.
"Managing Resource Revenues in Developing Economies,"
OxCarre Working Papers
015, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
- Paul Collier & Rick Van Der Ploeg & Michael Spence & Anthony J Venables, 2010. "Managing Resource Revenues in Developing Economies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 57(1), pages 84-118, April.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521583299 is not listed on IDEAS
- John Thornton & Fabian Bornhorst & Sanjeev Gupta, 2008. "Natural Resource Endowments, Governance, and the Domestic Revenueeffort; Evidence From a Panel of Countries," IMF Working Papers 08/170, International Monetary Fund.
- Thomas P. Tanger�s & Nils-Petter Lagerlöf, 2009. "Ethnic Diversity, Civil War and Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 1-27, 03.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521794497 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kimenyi, Mwangi S. & Mbaku, John Mukum, 1996. "Rents, military elites, and political democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 699-708, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:17/2012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael Reiter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.