Rents, military elites, and political democracy
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References listed on IDEAS
- John Mbaku, 1992. "Political instability and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Further evidence," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 39-53, June.
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- Mbaku, John M, 1991. "Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 19-31, August.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Antonis Adam, 2012. "Military conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 715-730, March.
- Raul Caruso & Jacopo Costa & Roberto Ricciuti, 2011.
"The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007,"
2011/26, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Jacopo Costa & Raul Caruso & Roberto Ricciuti, 2012. "The Probability of Military Rule in Africa, 1970-2007," Working Papers 17/2012, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- Leon, Gabriel, 2014. "Strategic redistribution: The political economy of populism in Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 39-51.
- Goel, Rajeev K. & Saunoris, James W., 2014. "Military versus non-military government spending and the shadow economy," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 350-359.
- Kalyvitis, Sarantis & Vlachaki, Irene, 2012.
"When does more aid imply less democracy? An empirical examination,"
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Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 132-146.
- Irene Vlachaki & Sarantis Kalyvitis, 2011. "When does more aid imply less democracy? An empirical examination," DEOS Working Papers 1125, Athens University of Economics and Business.
- Falkinger, Josef, 1999. "Social instability and redistribution of income," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 35-51, March.
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- Jennifer Brauner, 2015. "Military spending and democracy," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(4), pages 409-423, August.
- Rajeev K. Goel & James W. Saunoris, 2016. "Military Buildups, Economic Development and Corruption," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 84(6), pages 697-722, December.
- Brauner Jennifer, 2012. "Military Spending and Democratisation," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-16, December.
- Gupta, Sanjeev & de Mello, Luiz & Sharan, Raju, 2001. "Corruption and military spending," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 749-777, November.
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