Rents, military elites, and political democracy
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- Mbaku, John M, 1991. " Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 19-31, August.
- John Mbaku, 1988. "Political instability and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some recent evidence," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 89-111, June.
- John Mbaku & Chris Paul, 1989. "Political instability in Africa: A rent-seeking approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 63-72, October.
- John Mbaku, 1992. "Political instability and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Further evidence," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 39-53, June.
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