IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/mlucee/200917.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Demokratie durch Entwicklungskonkurrenz

Author

Listed:
  • Wockenfuß, Christof

Abstract

Wie könnten Demokratisierungsprozesse weltweit wirksamer gefördert werden als bisher? Einige Autoren schlagen zu diesem Zweck bilaterale Verträge über einen Tausch von Entwicklungshilfe als Gegenleistung für institutionelle Reformen in Richtung Demokratie vor. Aus der Perspektive der Normativen Institutionenökonomik lassen sich jedoch zwei Probleme kollektiven Handelns identifizieren, die eine solche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit gegenwärtig erheblich erschweren. Diese Probleme könnten durch einen geeigneten Mechanismus globaler Governance überwunden werden. Die zentrale Idee des hier skizzierten Lösungsvorschlages ist die Herstellung von „Entwicklungskonkurrenz“ zwischen den Regierungen der Zielländer zum Zwecke der Demokratieförderung.

Suggested Citation

  • Wockenfuß, Christof, 2009. "Demokratie durch Entwicklungskonkurrenz," Discussion Papers 2009-17, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:200917
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/170327/1/dp2009-17.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dan G. Cox & A. Cooper Drury, 2006. "Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 43(6), pages 709-722, November.
    2. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, October.
    3. Roland Kirstein & Stefan Voigt, "undated". "The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2001-default/2001/1-1020, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    4. Doyle, Michael W., 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1151-1169, December.
    5. Andrew Williams & Abu Siddique, 2008. "The use (and abuse) of governance indicators in economics: a review," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-175, May.
    6. David Dollar & Craig Burnside, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September.
    7. Ulrich,Peter, 2008. "Integrative Economic Ethics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521877961, October.
    8. Martin Petrick & Ingo Pies, 2007. "In search for rules that secure gains from cooperation: the heuristic value of social dilemmas for normative institutional economics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 251-271, June.
    9. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, October.
    10. Todd Sandler, 1998. "Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 221-247, August.
    11. Wintrobe, Ronald, 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 849-872, September.
    12. Pies, Ingo, 2009. "Das ordonomische Forschungsprogramm," Discussion Papers 2009-7, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    13. Sandler,Todd, 2004. "Global Collective Action," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521834773, October.
    14. Sandler,Todd, 2004. "Global Collective Action," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521542548, October.
    15. De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 2006. "Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 637-642, November.
    16. Burnside, Craig & Dollar, David, 2004. "Aid, policies, and growth : revisiting the evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3251, The World Bank.
    17. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
    18. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    19. Pies, Ingo & Hielscher, Stefan & Beckmann, Markus, 2009. "Moral Commitments and the Societal Role of Business: An Ordonomic Approach to Corporate Citizenship," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(3), pages 375-401, July.
    20. Roland Kirstein & Stefan Voigt, 2006. "The Violent and the Weak," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 863-889, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wockenfuß Christof, 2010. "Demokratie durch Entwicklungskonkurrenz. Ein ordnungspolitischer Beitrag zur internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit / Democracy Through Development Competition. An Ordo-Liberal Perspective on the ," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 61(1), pages 325-352, January.
    2. Pies Ingo & Wockenfuß Christof, 2008. "Armutsbekämpfung versus Demokratieförderung: Wie lässt sich der entwicklungspolitische Trade-Off überwinden? / Poverty reduction versus democracy promotion? How to overcome the trade-off in developmen," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 405-440, January.
    3. Pies, Ingo & Wockenfuß, Christof, 2008. "Armutsbekämpfung versus Demokratieförderung: Wie lässt sich der entwicklungspolitische Trade-Off überwinden?," Discussion Papers 2008-3, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    4. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020. "Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
    5. Alessandra Cepparulo & Luisa Giuriato, 2012. "Global Challenges and Country-Specific Responses through Aid Financing of Global Public Goods," Working Papers in Public Economics 156, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    6. Todd Sandler, 2009. "Intergenerational Public Goods: Transnational Considerations," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(3), pages 353-370, July.
    7. Petros Sekeris, 2011. "Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 237-258, September.
    8. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2007. "Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1684-1707, September.
    9. Sezer Yasar & Ceyhun Elgin, 2024. "Democracy and fiscal-policy response to COVID-19," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(1), pages 25-45, January.
    10. Sebastian Coll, 2008. "The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 313-355, December.
    11. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    12. Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce, 2007. "New face of development assistance: public goods and changing ethics," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4), pages 527-544.
    13. Anne van Aaken & Janis Antonovics & Todd Sandler, 2016. "Strategic Aspects of Difficult Global Challenges," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 7, pages 33-44, May.
    14. Parag Chandra & Saptorshee Kanto Chakraborty, 2017. "A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Transnational Public Goods (TPGs) to Upgrade Environmental Quality," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 15(2), pages 227-240, June.
    15. Hielscher, Stefan, 2008. "Die Sachs-Easterly-Kontroverse: "Dissent on Development" revisited," Discussion Papers 2008-6, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    16. Gregory, Paul R. & Schröder, Philipp J.H. & Sonin, Konstantin, 2011. "Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin's archives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 34-42, March.
    17. Michael K Miller, 2013. "Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 153-181, April.
    18. Raj Verma, 2022. "Instability in Afghanistan and Non‐traditional Security Threats: A Public Good Problem?," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 13(1), pages 152-159, February.
    19. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-141, March.
    20. Alice Nicole Sindzingre, 2015. "‘Policy Externalisation’ Inherent Failure: International Financial Institutions’ Conditionality in Developing Countries," Post-Print hal-01668363, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Demokratieförderung; Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; Entwicklungskonkurrenz; Global Governance; Normative Institutionenökonomik; Democracy Assistance; Development Cooperation; Development Competition; Global Governance; Constitutional Political Economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:200917. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/wwhalde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.